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LEGAL SETS
Jeremy N. Sheff †

In this Article, I propose that the practices of legal reasoning and analysis are
helpfully understood as being primarily concerned not with rules or propositions, but
with sets. This Article develops a formal model of the role of sets in the practices of
legal actors in a common-law system defined by a recursive relationship between
cases and rules. In doing so, it demonstrates how conceiving of legal doctrines as a
universe of discourse comprising (sometimes nested or overlapping) sets of cases can
clarify the logical structure that governs marginal cases and help organize the
available options for resolving such cases according to their form. While many legal
professionals may intuitively navigate this set-theoretic structure, the formal model
of that structure has important implications for legal theory. In particular, it (1)
generates a useful account of the relationships among rules, standards, and
principles; (2) provides a novel set of tools for understanding the nature of precedent;
and (3) illuminates an extra-linguistic dimension to the problem of judicial
discretion. On the last point, I argue that discretion is not merely a product of the
imperfect relationship between abstractions and reality, or between natural language
and the world, but that it is instead an emergent property of the structure of legal
practice: a structure composed of sets “all the way down.”

† Professor of Law & Faculty Director, Intellectual Property Law Center, St. John’s
University School of Law. I am grateful for comments and suggestions from Brian Bix, David
Carlson, Marc DeGirolami, Greg Keating, Anita Krishnakumar, Sara Lawsky, Josh Sarnoff, and
Larry Solum. All errors are the author’s alone.
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INTRODUCTION
Legal reasoning and analysis are helpfully understood as being
primarily concerned, not with rules, or even with propositions, but with
sets. Set-based logic permeates mature legal systems, and constitutes the
deep structure connecting legal authorities to the behavior of legal
actors. This is particularly so in common-law systems, where judicial
opinions serve a dual function as both backward-looking dispositions
and forward-looking authorities, setting up a recursive dynamic that can
best be modeled using the logic of sets. In this Article, I will explain that
logic and describe some of its implications.
Consider that in many areas of law, our adversarial legal system
channels disputes toward binary choices: Does this complaint state a
cause of action or not? Is this statute constitutional or not? Is this
defendant liable or not? Is this claimed element of damages recoverable
or not? 1 Even where a rule appears not to be framed in terms of binary
outcomes, it is usually trivially easy to re-frame it in such a way: instead
of asking “how broad is the plaintiff’s right?” we might instead ask “does
the plaintiff have a right to x enforceable against this defendant?” 2
Indeed, this is an essential move in legal reasoning: the process of
resolving legal disputes often consists of channeling amorphous,
complex issues into a series of discrete binary questions winnowed and
tested via the adversarial process. 3 Reaching one of those binary
outcomes typically depends on a judgment as to whether the facts of a
case satisfy some test defined by a legal rule: Does this paragraph of the
plaintiff’s complaint recite “mere conclusory statements”? 4 Is this
statute’s effect on private speech limited to the punishment of “fighting

See RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 119–20 (1985).
Cf. generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS
APPLIED IN JUDICIAL REASONING: AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter Wheeler Cook ed., 1919).
3 See MARC O. DEGIROLAMI, THE TRAGEDY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 223 n.24 (2013)
(citing TIMOTHY ANDREW ORVILLE ENDICOTT, VAGUENESS IN LAW 72 (2000) (“It is a
consistent feature of legal systems that legal institutions treat legal standards as if their
application were bivalent.”)).
4 See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678–79 (2009).
1
2
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words”? 5 Would this liquidated damages award constitute a “penalty”? 6
And so on.
My first claim is that all such legal rules can be understood to
define categories, and the application of those rules to the facts of a
particular case thus consists of a determination whether a particular
state of the world falls within or without a relevant category. This first
claim marks a minor departure from the sentential deontic models
common in contemporary law and logic theory, 7 but it has clear
antecedents in Anglo-American legal theory. H. L. A. Hart noted that
“[a]ll rules involve recognizing or classifying particular cases as
instances of general terms.” 8 Likewise, Frederick Schauer draws heavily
on the notion of categories (and the related notion of generalizations) in
his philosophical investigation of the nature of rules. 9 Indeed, all
analysis—legal or otherwise—may at some level be reduced to this type
of “lumping” and “splitting.” 10 But in this Article, my aim is to formalize
the insight into a model of legal analysis, because such formalization
yields new insights emergent from the model itself. As one prominent
history of formal logic points out:
Formalization is a difficult and tricky business, but it serves a
valuable purpose. It reveals structure and function in naked clarity, as
5 Compare, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386–96 (1992), with Snyder v.
Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215 n.3 (2011); id. at 1226–27 (Alito, J., dissenting).
6 U.C.C. § 2-718 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2017); see, e.g., Equitable Lumber
Corp. v. IPA Land Dev. Corp., 344 N.E.2d 391, 397 (N.Y. 1976).
7 See generally PABLO. E. NAVARRO & JORGE L. RODRÍGUEZ, DEONTIC LOGIC AND LEGAL
SYSTEMS (2014).
8 H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 123 (2d ed. 1994); see also id. at 124 (“[T]he law
must predominantly, but by no means exclusively, refer to classes of person, and to classes of
acts, things, and circumstances; and its successful operation over vast areas of social life
depends on a widely diffused capacity to recognize particular acts, things, and circumstances as
instances of the general classifications which the law makes.”) (emphasis in original).
9 See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL
EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 18–21 (1991).
10 Bradley C. Karkkainen, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and in the World: Some
Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 479 (2004) (“It is
sometimes said that the two most basic intellectual moves are ‘lumping’ and ‘splitting’—that is,
finding relevant common characteristics that allow us intelligently and usefully to group
apparently distinct phenomena into a single category (‘lumping’), and finding relevant
distinguishing characteristics that allow us intelligently and usefully to separate otherwise
similar phenomena into distinct classes (‘splitting’).”).
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does a cutaway working model of a machine. When a system has
been formalized, the logical relations between . . . propositions are
exposed to view; one is able to see the structural patterns of various
“strings” of “meaningless” signs, how they hang together, how they
are combined, how they nest in one another, and so on. 11

This type of formalization must be distinguished from the typical
meaning of the term “formalism” in legal theory. Historically,
“formalism” in Anglo-American jurisprudence is (fairly or not) a
pejorative term: it is a foil for the distinctively American school of Legal
Realism. 12 Even in its most sophisticated iterations, this concept of
formalism is at bottom a substantive and indeed a normative construct:
it distinguishes legitimate bases for judicial decision-making from
illegitimate ones, and makes claims regarding the extent to which legal
authorities determine adjudicative outcomes or constrain judicial
behavior. 13 In this Article, I will avoid most of the normative questions
that divide realists and anti-realists in an attempt to clarify the formal
structure of legal analysis in a model that has explanatory power
regardless of one’s substantive views or normative commitments
regarding the nature of adjudication. As we will see, however, this
purely formal model lends some support to realist claims regarding the
indeterminacy of legal rules and to positivist claims regarding the
primacy of practice in determining what a society’s law is.
My formal model will be built upon a particular vocabulary. In
philosophy, logic, and mathematics, category definition is the province
of set theory. Thus, if categories truly do play an important role in legal
analysis, the tools of set theory may fruitfully be applied to the
relationship between legal rules and particular cases, and ultimately to
the relationships among legal rules themselves. For these purposes, a
“rule” is any legal directive, formulated at any level of precision or
generality, that purports to direct the behavior of actors within a legal

11 ERNEST NAGEL & JAMES R. NEWMAN, GÖDEL’S PROOF 26 (Douglas R. Hofstadter ed., rev.
ed. 2001).
12 Compare BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF
POLITICS IN JUDGING (2010), with Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the
Issue?, 16 LEGAL THEORY 111 (2010).
13 See generally Leiter, supra note 12.
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system. 14 A “case” is any state of the world that has generated a legal
dispute subject to evaluation within that legal system. In this way of
thinking, what lawyers describe as “application of law to facts” is best
understood as evaluation of the set-theoretic concept of membership or
belonging: whether a particular state of the world can be situated within
a category defined by a relevant legal rule.
Starting with this foundational notion of the relationship between
rules and cases, I construct in this Article a set-theoretic and purely
formal model of the structure of legal doctrine in a common-law system.
In doing so I will rely primarily (though not exclusively) on examples
from my own fields of substantive expertise: property and intellectual
property (IP) law. For example: whether or not a transferee of a
leasehold interest can be held directly liable to the original lessor for
failure to pay rent often depends on whether the transfer falls into the
category of “assignment” or the category of “sublease.” Which of those
two categories any particular transfer falls into typically depends, in
turn, on whether the instrument of transfer provides for the original
lessee to retain any part of the leasehold interest.15 This set of rules can
be formalized and related to one another in an overarching structure via
the set-theoretic relations of membership and inclusion—as I will
illustrate below. 16
Moreover, as we will see, in common-law systems this structure is
recursive: rules inform the disposition of cases, while the dispositions of
cases collectively and inductively inform the development of new rules
over time. Conceiving of legal doctrine in terms of sets, rather than
propositions, allows a clearer understanding of the dynamic process by
which the practices of legal actors generate the development and
modification of legal directives. And importantly, it reveals how certain

14 The word “rule” here is thus not intended to reflect the particular meaning of the word
“rule” in contrast with the word “standard” as the dichotomy is typically framed in legal theory;
I discuss the relationship between my set-theoretic model and the rules/standards dichotomy
(including the dimensions of precision and generality) in Section IV.B, infra.
15 See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 505 F.2d 1282, 1286 (Ct. Cl. 1974) (quoting Haynes v.
Eagle-Picher Co., 295 F.2d 761, 763 (10th Cir. 1961)); Duck Creek Tire Serv., Inc. v. Goodyear
Corners, L.C., 796 N.W.2d 886, 893 (Iowa 2011); Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 73
P.2d 1163, 1168 (1937).
16 See infra Section II.A.
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dynamics of doctrinal change emerge predictably from the structure of a
common-law system, rather than the substance of particular rules.
Formalization along these lines is the key to my second claim: that
understanding the structure of legal analysis in terms of set theory
reveals subtle formal distinctions in the behavioral strategies legal actors
may deploy when faced with underdeterminate (or contradictory) legal
rules. Thus, regardless of their substantive conclusions regarding the
outcome of a particular case, and indeed independently of the
justification for that outcome, legal actors will often have the freedom to
implement their conclusion in a number of formally distinguishable
ways. Distinctions among these strategies map directly to distinctions
between the set-theoretic relations of membership and inclusion. We
will see that the choice of a formal strategy has important implications
for the claims made by any particular act of advocacy or adjudication
against the body of doctrine within which it is situated.
Understanding these formal distinctions in the behavior of legal
actors leads to my third claim: that important objects of study and
debate in substantive legal theory—such as the distinction between rules
and standards, the nature of precedent, and the problem of judicial
discretion—are emergent properties of the set-theoretic structure within
which legal practice operates: a system of cases categorized according to
multiple, overlapping rules. In short, the logical structure of the
relationship between rules and cases is what generates some of our most
persistent jurisprudential concerns. These concerns are emergent
features of the system’s most elementary structures.
To be clear: I intend to demonstrate that a set-theoretic model of
the structure of legal systems is extremely useful in understanding those
systems, but I do not claim—nor do I in fact believe—that set theory can
provide a complete model of legal systems, nor that it can answer all the
important questions in legal theory or jurisprudence. I am not here
making a claim about what law is in any metaphysical sense, about what
makes it law as opposed to something else, about the appropriate scope
of precedent, about the appropriate degree of constraint or discretion
for judges, about the sources of normative content that do or should
guide judicial decision-making, about law’s relation to morality or to
tradition, or any similar jurisprudential concern. Nor do I intend to
defend any claim about the proper interpretation of legal texts or any
other prescriptive theory of adjudication. On the contrary, my point is
merely that the logical structure of legal doctrine necessarily implies
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certain behavioral options in the context of specific legal disputes, and
that these options are in fact independent of any such substantive or
normative concerns—that they emerge from the structure of the legal
system itself.
These claims, though modest, fill an unfortunate gap in the
literature. There has never been an effort to formalize legal reasoning
along the lines I attempt in this Article. This may be because the
theoretical tools I will rely on were just gaining traction in philosophy at
roughly the same time the American Legal Realists launched their
program against formalist models of adjudication, 17 and have since been
largely abandoned to mathematicians as twentieth-century philosophy
took its linguistic turn. 18 Today, the formal logic of legal systems is a
subject that is mainly of interest to philosophers, 19 to those interested in
the possibility of representing legal reasoning using the tools of artificial

17 For example, when Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica was first published,
Jerome Frank was already a law student on his way to private practice. Compare Frank, Jerome
New, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/frank-jerome-new [https://perma.cc/
TC5Q-PX6K] (last visited Mar. 26, 2019), with Andrew David Irvine, Principia Mathematica,
STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL., https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/principiamathematica [https://perma.cc/ZXN4-NA96] (last updated Mar. 10, 2015). By the time the
disciplines of philosophy and mathematics had sufficiently digested the Principia to generate
Gödel’s breakthroughs, Karl Llewellyn and Max Radin were busy advancing the Realist
program from perches on prominent law school faculties. See generally, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn,
A Realistic Jurisprudence—The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431 (1930); Max Radin, Statutory
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). Indeed, when Radin refers to the “determinables”
and “determinates” of W. E. Johnson’s Logic, in his disquisition on statutory interpretation, he
is unwittingly relying on a philosopher whose efforts were soon to be overtaken by the system
of Russell and Whitehead (and by the increasingly formal logics that followed), in keeping with
the more general movement of the study of logic from philosophers to mathematicians. See id.
at 868–70; JOHN PASSMORE, A HUNDRED YEARS OF PHILOSOPHY 343–45, 394 (2d ed. 1966).
18 The “linguistic turn” is a term of art in intellectual history and refers to an increased
focus in post-war analytic (i.e., Anglo-American) philosophy on the philosophy of language, for
which first-order symbolic logic of the type relied on in this Article was quickly deemed
unsuitable. The term itself was popularized in THE LINGUISTIC TURN: ESSAYS IN
PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD (Richard M. Rorty ed., 1992). See generally Peter M.S. Hacker, The
Linguistic Turn in Analytic Philosophy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF
ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY 926 (Michael Beaney ed., 2013).
19 See generally, e.g., Carlos E. Alchourrón, On Law and Logic, 9 RATIO JURIS 331 (1996);
Richard Holton, Modeling Legal Rules, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE
LAW 165 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
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intelligence, 20 and to scholars in the code-based civil law tradition 21—
with some notable and worthy exceptions. 22 But lawyers and commonlaw legal scholars can benefit from greater attention to the common law
as a distinctive logical system.
One important area of application is in legal education. The model
developed in this paper will be useful to legal educators and law
students, as a guide to the types of analytical moves that are part of
“thinking like a lawyer.” For law students who tend to think graphically
or spatially, in particular, the familiar graphical representations of sets
in Venn diagrams is likely to be a particular aid to understanding and
mastery of legal habits of mind such as analogy and distinction, the
extraction of rules from cases, and the flexible scope of rule-application.
Second, the tools of set theory are also of use to the practicing lawyer,
judge, and legal commentator, because they offer a more precise
vocabulary for identifying and critiquing poor legal reasoning that the
typical rhetorical approach may gloss over. Finally, the set-theoretic
model I will develop here has implications for legal theory, where heated
substantive debates often leave important formal ambiguities
20 See generally, e.g., Carlos E. Alchourrón, Philosophical Foundations of Deontic Logic and
the Logic of Defeasible Conditionals, in DEONTIC LOGIC IN COMPUTER SCIENCE: NORMATIVE
SYSTEM SPECIFICATION 43 (John-Jules Ch. Meyer & Roel J. Wieringa eds., 1993); John F. Horty
& Trevor J.M. Bench-Capon, A Factor-Based Definition of Precedential Constraint, 20
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 181 (2012); Henry Prakken, Logical Tools for Modelling Legal
Argument: A Study of Defeasible Reasoning in Law, 64 STUDIA LOGICA: AN INT’L J. FOR
SYMBOLIC LOGIC 143 (2000).
21 For example, one recent compilation of essays (in English) on legal logic included
contributions from twenty-four authors, only six of whom are from common-law countries.
THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY, at xi (Jordi Ferrer Beltrán &
Giovanni Battista Ratti eds., 2012). See also, e.g., NAVARRO & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7
(Argentinian authors); Jaap Hage, Law, Logic and Defeasibility, 11 ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE &
L. 221 (2003) (Dutch author).
22 See generally Horty & Bench-Capon, supra note 20; Henry Prakken & Giovanni Sartor,
Modelling Reasoning with Precedents in a Formal Dialogue Game, in JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 127 (Giovanni Sartor & Karl Branting eds., 1998). One leading
American scholar of legal logic, Sara Lawsky, not coincidentally works primarily in the heavily
codified field of tax law. See generally, e.g., Sarah B. Lawsky, A Logic for Statutes, 21 FLA. TAX
REV. 60 (2017). Other innovative scholarship has focused on the potential of non-classical
logics to illuminate particular aspects of legal reasoning such as fact-finding. See generally, e.g.,
Kevin M. Clermont, Conjunction of Evidence and Multivalent Logic, in LAW AND THE NEW
LOGICS 32 (H. Patrick Glenn & Lionel D. Smith eds., 2017); Vern R. Walker, A Default-Logic
Paradigm for Legal Fact-Finding, 47 JURIMETRICS J. 193 (2007).
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unexamined. Not only can the set-theoretic model help cut through
those ambiguities, but it also shows how some of these substantive
debates are actually generated by inescapable structural features of law
as a social practice.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides a brief overview
of naïve set theory for those unfamiliar with it, introducing the
terminology and concepts that will be deployed in the analysis that
follows; those who feel comfortable with the concepts and notation
systems of set theory and predicate logic may skim or skip this section.
Parts II and III build the scaffolding of a set-theoretic model of law. Part
II demonstrates how the tools of set theory can be deployed to analyze
the relationship between rules and cases, and how legal doctrines can be
modeled using set-theoretic concepts. Part III demonstrates more
complex interactions of rules and cases, focusing on “hard cases” in
which multiple applicable legal rules appear to contradict one another.
This Part provides a more thorough description of the strategies legal
actors can use to resolve such doctrinal conflicts at various levels of
formal structure. Part IV discusses some implications and limitations of
a set-theoretic understanding of legal doctrine, including its interaction
with other aspects of legal theory.
I. NAÏVE SET THEORY: A PRIMER
Most people who have any degree of legal education will have at
least a passing familiarity with the concept of sets—if for no other
reason than because they are a staple of primary and secondary school
mathematics, where they are the stuff of hazily remembered Venn
diagrams. Sets are a pillar of modern mathematics: Axiomatic set theory
is the basis for rigorous definitions of numbers, for setting up the rules
of arithmetic and higher mathematics, for describing the nature of
mathematical functions and geometry, and for constructing the types of
abstract analyses of which modern mathematical proofs are made. 23
Fortunately, we require a far lesser degree of rigor to make sets useful
for the analysis of legal doctrine. We will confine ourselves here to so-

23 See generally JOSÉ FERREIRÓS, LABYRINTH OF THOUGHT: A HISTORY OF SET THEORY AND
ITS ROLE IN MODERN MATHEMATICS (1999).
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called “naïve” set theory of the type that one might encounter in an
undergraduate, or even a high school, course—though some useful
axioms will be introduced in a very informal way where appropriate.
This Part also makes use of the standard notation system of predicate
logic, familiarity with which is assumed.
A.

Membership, Construction, Equality, and Inclusion

A “set” was defined by Georg Cantor as “any collection into a
whole M of definite and separate objects m of our intuition or our
thought. These objects are called the ‘elements’ of M.” 24 The relationship
between a set and its elements—the relation of belonging or
membership—is the most primitive relation in set theory, 25 and is the
most important aspect of the theory for our purposes. For any given set
A and one of its members x, we may say: “x is an element of A” or, in
formal notation:
x∈A

Using this basic relation of membership, we can “construct” sets
using at least two strategies. First, we can define a set by simply listing
its elements. For example, as of this writing the set J of all active United
States Supreme Court Justices is a finite set consisting of the following
nine elements: Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg,
Justice Breyer, Justice Alito, Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, Justice
Gorsuch, and Justice Kavanaugh. We can formally define such a finite
set extensionally: that is, we can define the set according to its elements
merely by listing each and every one of those elements, i.e.:

24 GEORG CANTOR, CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FOUNDING OF THE THEORY OF TRANSFINITE
NUMBERS 85 (Philip E. B. Jourdain trans., 1915). This definition was later found to be
insufficient to ground a coherent set theory free of logical paradoxes (see note 28, infra),
causing thinkers such as Zermelo, Russell, Quine, von Neumann, Gödel, Fraenkel, and others
to refine the theory of sets to avoid such paradoxes. These refinements are the basis of
axiomatic set theory, which is of great interest to mathematicians, computer scientists, and
logicians, but of little use to the present project. A. A. FRAENKEL ET AL., FOUNDATIONS OF SET
THEORY 22–28 (J. Barwise et al. eds, 2d rev. ed. 1973).
25 PAUL R. HALMOS, NAIVE SET THEORY 2 (1960).
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J = {Roberts, Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito, Sotomayor,
Kagan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh}
This method of construction gives us occasion to invoke an
important axiom: the axiom of extensionality, which provides the basis
for the definition of the equality relation between sets. The axiom of
extensionality specifies that sets are defined according to their extension
(i.e., the full list of their elements), and therefore two sets are equal to
each other if and only if they have exactly the same elements. 26
Extensional definition is obviously cumbersome for all but the
smallest sets, and it is not especially informative regarding the qualities
of the sets so defined. A more useful and parsimonious construction of a
set of interest would invoke some common characteristic(s) that the
elements of the set share, which distinguishes them from all other things
we might have in mind that are not elements of the set. Here, an
intensional definition of the set of interest—call this set J1—is needed.
To build such a definition, we require some predicate statement
concerning members of our set that identifies them and distinguishes
them from other objects. Our earlier casual definition, “the set of all
active United States Supreme Court Justices,” suggests a useful
predicate. We can define J1 as the set of all objects x such that x is an
active United States Supreme Court Justice. In formal notation:
J1 = {x: x is an active United States Supreme Court Justice}
Or, alternatively, using a predicate symbol to express our
intensional definition:
P(x) = x is an active United States Supreme Court Justice
J1 = {x: P(x)}
Note that once this predicate is evaluated against objects in the
world and the resulting list of elements of J1 is fully extended, those
elements will be exactly the same as the previously enumerated elements
of J according to our extensional definition of J. Therefore, according to
our definition of the equality relation between sets pursuant to the
axiom of extensionality:
26 FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 22–28. Formally, using the notation system of firstorder logic, we may state the axiom of extensionality thus:

∀𝐴 ∀𝐵 [∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 ↔𝑥 ∈ 𝐵)→𝐴=𝐵]
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J1 = J
Some important features of our methods for constructing these sets
bear mention. First, it should be apparent that our intensional definition
of J1 implies many other definitional statements that might be useful for
distinguishing objects of study from one another. For example, the fact
that x is a Supreme Court Justice implies that x is a human being, that x
is a judge, that x is a federal judge, that x is an Article III federal judge.
We may or may not need to make these implicit definitions explicit,
depending on what the purpose of our analysis is. If we are interested in
understanding the set of Supreme Court Justices in relation to other
Article III judges, we might explicitly confine our analysis to Article III
judges and define our sets as collections of objects from that larger
group. For any given analysis, we can call the group of all objects that
are candidates for inclusion in or exclusion from sets the universe of
discourse. 27
Second, it should be clear that this understanding of the universe of
discourse also defines a set. That is, the universe of discourse is a set of
all objects that may come under consideration in a given analysis. 28 By
27 GEORGE BOOLE, AN INVESTIGATION OF THE LAWS OF THOUGHT, ON WHICH ARE
FOUNDED THE MATHEMATICAL THEORIES OF LOGIC AND PROBABILITIES 42 (1854) (“In every
discourse, whether of the mind conversing with its own thoughts, or of the individual in his
intercourse with others, there is an assumed or expressed limit within which the subjects of its
operation are confined. . . . Now, whatever may be the extent of the field within which all the
objects of our discourse are found, that field may properly be termed the universe of
discourse.”).
28 Understood at its most capacious and abstract, a universal set can pose fundamental
challenges to the coherence of set theory. For example, if defined as “the set of all possible
things,” U also by definition contains all sets containing members of U, and also contains U
itself. This inherent self-reference leads to the potential for logical paradoxes, or “antinomies,”
that arise from infinite recursion. The most famous of these is Russell’s Paradox, which posits
the existence of a set composed of all sets that are not members of themselves. Such a set would
be a member of itself if and only if it were not a member of itself—a logical contradiction. See
BERTRAND RUSSELL, THE PRINCIPLES OF MATHEMATICS 101–03 (1996). But nothing in naïve set
theory would seem to preclude an intensional definition of a set based on such an infinitely
recursive predicate (i.e., that the set is a member of itself). The decline of Cantor’s naïve set
theory, and the rise in the twentieth century of axiomatic theories that disclaim the existence of
any truly Universal set, is a product of the effort to avoid this type of paradox.
Fortunately, for our purposes, we are not attempting to build an internally consistent
system of logic or provide an axiomatic framework for all of mathematics, and we are not
interested in plumbing the nature of infinity or of the set of all possible sets. We are instead
merely using the language of sets as a convenient shorthand for the logical relationships
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convention, we will call this universal set U. So, for our sets J and J1
above, the universal set U might be defined as the set of all human
beings, or of all judges, or of all federal judges, or of all Article III federal
judges, depending on what universe of discourse we are trying to make
meaningful statements about.
This leads us to a third important relation in naïve set theory: the
relation of inclusion, which is based on the concept of the subset,
indicated by the symbol ⊆. Let us say—by way of definition—that a set
A is a subset of another set B where each and every element of A is also
an element of B. We may also say, conversely, that the set B includes its
subset A. 29
Under this definition of inclusion, B may well have elements in
addition to the elements of A, but it need not. Sets that are equal to one
another are also subsets of one another, and every set is a subset of
itself. 30 Furthermore, it should be apparent that the relation of inclusion
is transitive: that is, if A is a subset of B and B is a subset of C, then A is
necessarily a subset of C. 31 Finally, it should be apparent that, whatever
our universe of discourse, any set we define within that universe will by
definition be included in, and therefore a subset of, the universal set U.
We can now move from the fundamental relations of membership,
equality, and inclusion to some other set theoretical concepts of interest
to the current project. Chief among these are union, intersection,
between certain clearly-defined objects of our interest and study, and the nature of our inquiry
is such that we can define those objects and relationships in such a way as to avoid these
paradoxes. In technical terms, we will take care to avoid any impredicative definitions of our
sets, including our universal sets. See id.; see also FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 38 (“A
definition of a set is called impredicative if it contains a reference to a totality to which the set
itself belongs.”). We will leave the formal objections to naïve set theory to the philosophers and
mathematicians.
29 FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 26. Formally, the relation of inclusion is defined as
follows:
∀𝐴 ∀𝐵 [∀𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 →𝑥 ∈ 𝐵) → 𝐴 ⊆ 𝐵]

Id. A subset that is not equal to the set that includes it is sometimes referred to as a
proper subset, but the distinction between a subset and a proper subset is not particularly useful
to this Article.
31 That is, each and every element of A is an element of B, and each and every element of B
is an element of C, meaning that each and every element of A must also be an element of C.
Formally:
30

[(𝐴 ⊆ 𝐵) ∧ (B ⊆ C)] → (𝐴 ⊆ C)
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difference, and complementation; analysis of these operations will yield
an understanding of disjointness, and of the null set.
B.

Set Algebra

Sets can be the subject of mathematical and logical operations that
make them useful analytical tools. Among these, the more interesting
for our purposes have to do with the relationships between sets.
1.

Union and Intersection; Disjointness and the Null Set

The union of two sets A and B, indicated by the symbol ⋃, is
defined as the set (call it C) containing all objects that are elements of
either A or B or both. 32 The union operation may be analogized to
addition in arithmetic, or to disjunction in sentential logic. We may
illustrate the concept of a union of sets graphically, using a Venn
diagram representing the set C as a union of sets A and B: 33
Figure 1

32
33

ABRAHAM A. FRAENKEL, ABSTRACT SET THEORY 18–20 (3d rev. ed. 1966).
We may also define the union function formally:
C = A ⋃ B → C = {x : (x ∈A) ∨(x ∈B)}
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Note that any set constructed as the union of two or more other sets
necessarily includes those other sets; i.e., the sets that are added together
are each subsets of the sum of those sets.
The intersection of two sets A and B, indicated by the symbol ∩, is
defined as the set (call it I) containing all objects that are elements of
both A and B. 34 It is thus analogous to conjunction in sentential logic.
Again, the intersection of two sets can be represented graphically: 35
Figure 2

34
35

FRAENKEL, supra note 32.
Again, the intersection function can also be defined formally:
I = A ∩ B → I = {x : (x ∈ A) ∧(x ∈ B)}
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Note that nothing about the nature of sets as we have defined them
up to this point requires our intersection set I to have any objects in it.
Should it be the case that A and B have no elements in common, the set
I will have no elements:
Figure 3

This set with no elements is unique: By the axiom of extensionality
all sets with the same elements are equivalent, and any set with no
elements is therefore equivalent to every other set with no elements.
This unique set with no elements is called the null set or empty set, and
is denoted by the symbol Ø. 36 Where, as in Figure 3, the intersection of
two sets A and B is the null set (i.e., where A and B have no members in
common), A and B are said to be disjoint sets. 37

36 FRAENKEL, supra note 32 at 16–18. Given our definition of subsets, it follows that the null
set is a subset of every set, including itself. Id.
37 FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 30.
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Difference and Complementation

The difference between two sets, A – B, is defined as the set of those
members of A that are not members of B. 38 As a matter of sentential
logic, it is analogous to conjunction with a negated premise. We can
represent this definition of set difference graphically: 39
Figure 4

Of course, it is possible that A and B will be disjoint sets, in which
case the difference A – B will simply be equivalent to A:

38
39

FRAENKEL, supra note 32, at 22–23.
Formally, difference is defined as follows:
[C = A – B] → [C = {x : (x ∈ A) ∧ (x ∉ B)}]
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Figure 5

Finally, where the universe of discourse is suitably specified, any set
A defined within the universal set U may be said to have a complement,
which is defined as the difference between the universal set and the
specified set, or U – A. 40 Put differently, this complement is the set of all
objects in the universe of discourse that are not elements of A. The
complement of the set A is designated as A', such that:
A' = U – A

Again, we can represent this definition of complementarity graphically:

40 HALMOS, supra note 25, at 17–18. It is precisely because of the paradoxes discussed in
note 28, supra, that complementation (like the universal set) is generally not well defined in
axiomatic set theory. FRAENKEL ET AL., supra note 24, at 40–41.
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Figure 6

Having defined some basic tools of naïve set theory, we are now in
a position to apply them to legal problems.
II. SETS IN LEGAL REASONING AND ANALYSIS
We can understand legal rules to provide intensional definitions of
sets. Such intensional definitions may operate either by inclusion or by
exclusion—some rules tell us what is in a category, others tell us what is
not in a category. For example, the category of legal infants is often
framed in an inclusionary way: it consists of all natural persons who are
younger than a certain age. 41 But the category of persons with legal
capacity to sue or be sued is usually framed in an exclusionary way: it
41 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-1d (West 2019) (“[T]he terms ‘minor’, ‘infant’ and
‘infancy’ shall be deemed to refer to a person under the age of eighteen years . . . .”); but see
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-101 (West 2019) (“The period of minority extends in all persons to the
age of eighteen (18) years, except that every person sixteen (16) years of age or over who is or
has been married shall be considered of the age of majority in all matters relating to contracts,
property rights, liabilities and the capacity to sue and be sued.”). The fact that this category
could also be framed in exclusionary terms is an example of the binary nature of so many legal
doctrines—an issue which will be developed more fully below. See, e.g., 23 PA. STAT. AND CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5101 (West 2019) (“Except where otherwise provided or prescribed by law, an
individual 18 years of age and older shall be deemed an adult . . . .”).
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consists of all persons who are not infants, insane, incapacitated, or
subject to some other legal disability. 42
On this understanding of the nature of legal rules, the application
of law to facts—that inescapable and inescapably contested analytical
process at the heart of legal systems—can be formally modeled as the
evaluation of the fundamental set-theoretic relation of membership.
Cases—not in the sense of “judicial opinions” or even “matters in
litigation” but in the sense of “states of the world that have generated
disputes subject to resolution by the legal system”—can be understood
as objects that may or may not be elements of the sets intensionally
defined by our legal rules. Other aspects of legal reasoning may similarly
be modeled in set-theoretic terms. Rules may be combined (or
reconciled) with one another using set-theoretic concepts such as union,
subtraction, intersection, and inclusion. Finally, in the quintessential
dynamic of common-law systems, judicial resolution of cases can, over
time, provide extensional definitions of new legal sets, and new legal
rules (i.e., intensional definitions) can be inferred by grouping judicial
decisions according to their outcomes and attempting to formulate
predicates that describe the states of the world—the cases—that
generated those similar outcomes. In this Part, I will illustrate the use of
set-theoretic concepts to model these basic features of legal reasoning
and analysis.
A.

Building Blocks: The Relationship Between Rules and Cases

Recall that the most fundamental relation in set theory is the
relationship between sets and elements (the relation of membership). I
propose that the analogue to this relationship in common-law legal
systems is the relationship between rules and cases. As every first-year
law student learns, the real work of legal analysis comes in applying a
rule to a set of facts that has generated a legal dispute—to a case.
Consider the example we introduced in the Introduction to this Article:
the distinction between an assignment and a sublease. 43 Where a
42 67A C.J.S. Parties § 10 (West 2019) (“A want of capacity to sue exists where there is some
legal disability, such as infancy, lunacy, idiocy, coverture, want of authority, or a want of title in
plaintiff in the character in which he or she sues.”).
43 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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transferee of some interest under a lease breaches some covenant of the
lease agreement, the landlord under the primary lease may attempt to
obtain monetary relief (as distinct from possession) directly against the
breaching transferee. Whether such direct relief is available depends on
whether the primary landlord and the transferee are “in privity,” and
this, in turn, depends on whether the transfer at issue is categorized as a
“sublease” or an “assignment.” Simplified somewhat, an assignment
puts the original lessor and the transferee in privity of estate (and thus
makes the transferee directly answerable to the original lessor in an
action for damages); a sublease does not. 44 The hornbook rule for
distinguishing among these two types of transfer is as follows:
An assignment of a term for years occurs where the lessee transfers
his or her entire interest therein, for the unexpired remainder of the
term created by the lease, without retaining any reversionary
interest. . . . A sublease occurs where a lessee underlets the premises
or a part thereof to a third person for a period less than the lessee’s
term. If the lessee reserves a reversionary interest in the term, it
constitutes a sublease, no matter how small the reversion and
regardless of the form of the instrument. 45

Thus, in any given action for damages brought by a landlord
against a transferee of a leasehold interest, the possible outcomes are—at
least at one level—binary: the landlord-plaintiff either can recover or
cannot recover against the transferee-defendant. Which of these two
binary outcomes will result from any particular set of facts depends on
categorization of the instrument by which the particular transferee
acquired her interest as either an assignment or a sublease. In short, the
state of the world that generated the dispute must be placed into one of
the categories defined by the hornbook rule.

44 See 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 62 (West 2019) (“Since there is neither privity of
contract nor privity of estate between the two, a subtenant normally owes no responsibility to
the original lessor, and the original lessor has no direct action with respect to the covenants in
the original lease as against the sublessee.”); 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 54 (West 2019)
(“When a lease is transferred by assignment, privity of estate ends between the lessor and lessee
and is created between the lessor and the assignee, who becomes bound by covenants running
with the land.”).
45 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 43 (West 2019).
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Some examples clarify this relationship between rules and cases. In
Berg v. Ridgway, 46 the plaintiff landlords sued the third successive
transferee of a ground lease for unpaid sums due under the primary
ground lease agreement with the original tenant. The defendant had
taken possession of the leased premises pursuant to a partnership
dissolution agreement whereby the partnership—itself a prior assignee
of the lease—agreed to “transfer, sell, assign and convey all right title
and interest . . . to the” defendant, who agreed to “purchase[] and
accept[] such transfer, assignment and conveyance.” 47 The defendant
claimed that he could not be held directly liable, based on language in
the original lease governing the liability of subtenants. But because the
dissolved partnership had retained no interest in the leased premises,
the court held that the transfer to the defendant was an assignment, not
a sublease, making the defendant directly liable to the original lessor for
performance of the lease covenants (and thus for damages)
notwithstanding the language in the primary lease. 48
By way of contrast, in Dunlap v. Bullard, 49 the defendant’s
predecessor acquired an interest in an existing lease via an instrument
that provided he was “to hold for a term equal to the whole of the
unexpired term of the original lease,” but also providing that the
transferor “might enter and take possession for breach of covenant,”
and that the transferee “would quit and deliver up the premises to the
lessor at the end of the term.” 50 The original lessor sued to recover for
unpaid taxes that were the responsibility of the tenant under the
primary lease. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court ordered
judgment for the defendant, reasoning that the reservation by the
transferee of a right to retake possession was inconsistent with an
assignment, insofar as it indicated “that the parties to this lease intended
to create the relation of landlord and tenant between themselves”—that
is, to create a sublease. 51

46
47
48
49
50
51

140 N.W.2d 95 (Iowa 1966).
Id. at 97.
Id. at 100.
131 Mass. 161 (1881).
Id. at 161.
Id. at 162–63.
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As before, we can build a set-theoretic model of the doctrines in
this area, either formulaically or graphically. First, we can conceive of
the universe of discourse as divided into two complementary sets
corresponding to the possible outcomes—intensionally defined as
judgment for plaintiff and judgment for the defendant. Let π be the set
of cases wherein a court enters judgment for the plaintiff and ∆ be the
set of cases wherein a court enters judgment for the defendant. Next, we
can intensionally define two sets predicated by our hornbook rules: let A
(for “assignment”) be the set of cases wherein the transferor has
conveyed her entire interest in a lease, and let S (for “sublease”) be the
set of cases wherein the transferor has conveyed less than her entire
interest in a lease. Because our hornbook rule tells us that the predicates
of the sets A and S determine the appropriate judicial resolution of a
legal dispute, we know they must have some relation to our universeexhausting complementary sets π and ∆. In particular, we know that any
case within set S will—under the rules we have so far discussed—result
in a judgment for the defendant, while any set of facts that falls within
set A will result in a judgment for the plaintiff. Thus, any element of S
will also be an element of ∆, while any element of A will also be an
element of π. In other words, S must be a subset of ∆, and A must be a
subset of π.
We cannot treat our legal-rule-defined sets as equal to our
universe-exhausting complements for a very important reason: legal
rules and inferences are generally defeasible. 52 That is, it may be that
there are other legal rules that might be brought to bear on a particular
case that would play a more important role in determining which of our
two binary outcomes is required in any particular case. We will consider
that possibility—and the ways in which it may alter a set-theoretic
model of a legal universe of discourse—in the following Section.
Before reaching that point, we need to incorporate actual cases into
our model. If, as posited above, we should treat the states of the world
52 For theoretical approaches to the logical concept of defeasibility and its role in legal
reasoning, see generally THE LOGIC OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS: ESSAYS ON DEFEASIBILITY (Jordi
Ferrer Beltrán & Giovanni Battista Ratti eds., 2012); Giovanni Sartor, Defeasibility in Legal
Reasoning, in INFORMATICS AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL REASONING 119 (1995); Henry
Prakken & Giovanni Sartor, The Three Faces of Defeasibility in the Law, 17 RATIO JURIS 118
(2004); Richard H. S. Tur, Defeasibilism, 21 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2001); John L.
Pollock, Defeasible Reasoning, 11 COGNITIVE SCI. 481 (1987).
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that generated the two judicial opinions discussed in this Section as
objects that can be elements of sets in our universe of discourse, we must
incorporate the cases into the model using the relation of membership.
Let b stand for Berg v. Ridgway, and let d stand for Dunlap v. Bullard.
We know that Berg was found to involve an assignment, and thus
resulted in judgment for the plaintiff; we can therefore say that b is an
element of set A and therefore—by inclusion—of set π. Similarly, we
know that Dunlap was found to involve a sublease, and thus resulted in
judgment for the defendant. We can therefore say that d is an element of
set S and therefore—by inclusion—of set ∆.
This gives us sufficient material to construct the simplest possible
model of a legal universe of discourse: a pair of rule-predicated sets
mapping to a binary outcome that exhausts the possible resolution of
cases that fall within the universe, with two exemplar cases as elements
of our two rule-based sets. With all the pieces in place, we can represent
this universe of discourse graphically:
Figure 7

If all legal doctrines were this simple, modeling them with set
theory would seem to be more trouble than it is worth. But as any
lawyer—or law student—knows (and as the rest of this Article will
explore), legal rules typically interact in more complex ways. And set
theory is a powerful tool for understanding that complexity by
constructing a model of the relevant universe of discourse that organizes
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the complex facts of real-world cases into comprehensible—if not
entirely stable—categories.
B.

More Complex Doctrines and Their Set-Theoretic Relations
1.

Union and Subtraction: Overlapping Rules

We can begin to complicate the picture without leaving the law of
subleases and assignments. Recall that in the previous Section we
refrained from treating the legal-rule-defined sets S and A as equal to
the universe-exhausting complements ∆ and π because of the
defeasibility of legal conclusions: It is possible that other legal rules
might compel a particular outcome in a particular case notwithstanding
the application of the rule regarding assignments and subleases. Our
first example of the interaction of multiple legal rules involves one such
additional rule: the rule regarding assumption of a primary lease by a
transferee.
Recall that assignments render transferees liable to the original
lessor while subleases do not because of the common-law requirement
of privity—satisfied in the case of assignments by the notion of privity of
estate. 53 But the common law developed another theory by which the
lessor could hold the transferee directly liable for damages: if a
transferee agreed to be bound to the covenants of a primary lease, that
would make the lessor under that primary lease a third-party beneficiary
of the transfer agreement, and thus create privity of contract between the
lessor and the transferee. 54 Indeed, this theory was available—though
superfluous—in Berg v. Ridgway. 55

Berg, 140 N.W.2d at 99–100.
The hornbooks recite this principle in the context of assignments, where it is far more
commonly applied: “[I]n cases in which the assignee expressly assumes the lessee’s obligations
under the lease, he or she may be bound to the lessor under privity of contract principles even
where the lessor is not a party to the assignment.” 52 C.J.S. Landlord & Tenant § 54 (West
2019).
55 140 N.W.2d at 100 (“The trial court could find defendant had agreed to perform all the
provisions of the lease during the period of his occupancy.”).
53
54
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A third case provides an example. In Hartman Ranch Co. v.
Associated Oil Co., 56 Hartman Ranch executed an oil and gas lease to
Joseph Dabney. 57 Dabney later executed an instrument—to which
Hartman was not a party—transferring Dabney’s interest under the
lease for the same term to Associated Oil. 58 Hartman subsequently
alleged a breach by Associated of an implied covenant in the primary
lease to Dabney and sued for damages in the form of unpaid royalties. 59
The transfer from Dabney to Associated “gave Dabney and his
associates a right of re-entry for breach of any stipulation therein.” 60
According to the “Massachusetts Rule” applied in Dunlap, then, the
transfer from Dabney to Associated Oil was a sublease rather than an
assignment—Dabney had reserved a right to retake possession in the
instrument of transfer. 61 This might have resolved the case in favor of
the transferee, Associated. But the transfer instrument also “contained
an express promise whereby defendant assumed the parent Hartman
lease,” 62 and the California Supreme Court held that this covenant put
Hartman and Associated into privity of contract through a third-party
beneficiary relationship. 63 Thus, Hartman was permitted to recover
damages against Associated on a contract—as opposed to a property—
theory. 64
Hartman requires some revision of our set-theoretic model of the
law of sublease and assignment. There are now two types of facts that
will allow for a plaintiff’s recovery: either an assignment, or an
assumption of the primary lease by the transferee. And whether or not
the transferee has assumed the primary lease is a fact that is independent
of the categorization of the transfer as a sublease or assignment: either
form of transfer might or might not include such an assumption of
covenants. We can model this slightly more complex universe of
discourse by invoking additional set-theoretic concepts.
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

73 P.2d 1163 (Cal. 1937).
Id. at 1166.
Id.
Id. at 1165–66
Id. at 1168.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1169–71.
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Let us identify a new set T, as the set of all cases in which a
transferee of a leasehold interest assumes the covenants of the primary
lease. Because assumption of the primary lease by the transferee
provides an independent basis for a plaintiff’s recovery, we know that T
will be a subset of π. And because we know that either an assignment or
an assumption of the primary lease will provide a basis for the plaintiff
to recover, we can identify the relationship between sets A, T, and π with
the logical operation of disjunction—which as previously discussed, 65
relates to the set-algebraic operation of union:
(A ⋃ T) ⊆ π

Indeed, assuming we have now identified and modeled all the legal
rules applicable to the universe of discourse, and that these rules exhaust
the relevant universe of discourse (which we will do here for simplicity’s
sake), we can simply posit:
π = (A ⋃ T)

Finally, we can identify all remaining cases in our simplified
universe of discourse—which, given our assumptions, is simply the
universe of all cases in which a landlord is seeking to recover damages
directly from a transferee of a primary lease—as subleases in which the
subtenant has not assumed the covenants of the primary lease. The
logical form of this construction—conjunction with a negated
premise—is, as we have previously noted, 66 analogous to the setalgebraic operation of subtraction:
∆ = (S – T)
We can now re-evaluate our cases for membership in the sets
intensionally defined by our three legal rules. We need to know whether
each of our three cases involves a sublease or an assignment, and we also
need to know whether the transferee assumed the primary lease in each
case. Given the discussion above we know that Dunlap and Hartman
involved subleases while Berg involved an assignment; we also know
that the transferee assumed the primary lease in Berg and Hartman but
not in Dunlap. Let h represent Hartman, just as b and d represent Berg

65
66

See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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and Dunlap, respectively. We can say that b is an element of sets A and
T but not of set S, that d is an element of set S but not of sets A or T, and
that h is an element of sets S and T but not of set S. With these
membership relations in place, and given the previously described
relationships between the sets in our universe of discourse, we can now
represent our universe of discourse graphically:

Figure 8
The use of union and subtraction to organize multiple applicable
legal rules is the simplest means of resolving potential conflicts between
such rules. But as Part III will demonstrate, it is not the only way of
doing so. Moreover, the different strategies for resolving such conflicts
are intimately related to the process of common-law doctrinal
development. But before exploring these strategies, we must first
examine the role of sets in other aspects of legal analysis.
2.

Inclusion: Special Circumstances, Included Offenses, Remedies
Enhancements

In building our first models of legal doctrine using set-theoretic
tools we conceived of the sets predicated by legal rules as subsets of our
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ultimate sets of interest: the complementary sets defining a binary
outcome of adjudication. This is a key role for the relation of inclusion
in set-theoretic models of legal doctrines, and one which we will
examine more fully in the following Part. But subsets—and the relation
of inclusion—can play other roles in basic legal analysis as well. The
nesting of legal categories within one another, according to the relation
of inclusion, is characteristic of all legal rules regarding special
circumstances that select a specific outcome within a more general class
of related outcomes. For example: in civil cases, remedies enhancements
may be triggered in a subset of cases that entitle the plaintiff to some
recovery. 67
Other legal doctrines that define questions of degree similarly rest
on the logic of inclusion. Consider the grading of crimes under the
Model Penal Code. We can take property crimes as an example. In
general, “[a] person is guilty of theft if he unlawfully takes, or exercises
unlawful control over, movable property of another with purpose to
deprive him thereof.” 68 But once the elements of the crime of theft are
established (an issue we will deal with in the next Section), the grade of
the crime will depend on other additional facts that may or may not be
proven in a particular case. Thus, theft of property with value of less
than $50, achieved without breach of fiduciary duty, threat, or taking
from the person of the victim, is a petty misdemeanor. Theft of property
with value exceeding $500, or of a firearm, or of a motor-propelled
vehicle is a third-degree felony. All other theft is a misdemeanor. 69 We
can understand each of the grades of theft under the Model Penal Code
as a subset of the crime of theft.
Again, we can express these relations both formally and
graphically. Consider a universe of discourse consisting of states of the
world in which a criminal defendant has committed the crime of theft.
Within this universe of discourse, we can define subsets of our universal
set according to the various facts that go not to the commission of the
crime, but to its degree:
67 See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2010) (providing statutory damages of up to $30,000 per
work for copyright infringement, but increasing this maximum to $150,000 where the
infringement is willful).
68 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.2(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962).
69 MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1(2)(a)–(b) (AM. LAW. INST. 1962).
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A = {x: x is a theft of property with value between $50 and $500}
B = {x: x is a theft achieved by breach of fiduciary duty}
C = {x: x is a theft achieved by threat}
D = {x: x is a theft achieved by taking from the person of the victim}
E = {x: x is a theft of property with value exceeding $500}
F = {x: x is a theft of a firearm}
G = {x: x is a theft of a motor-propelled vehicle}
We can also define the degrees of theft as sets in their own right:
M = {x: x is a misdemeanor theft}
N = {x: x is a third-degree felony theft}
P = {x: x is a petty misdemeanor theft}
The relationships among all the sets we have defined, both between each
other and in relation to the universal set U, are best modeled with the
set-theoretic relation of inclusion. Based on the text of the Model Penal
Code, any of the material facts going to degree is sufficient to determine
the degree of the offense; this disjunctive relationship means that we can
use the previously discussed operations of union and subtraction to
model how each of the material facts going to degree relate to
classification of a particular case within a particular degree of offense:
N=E⋃F⋃G
M=A⋃B⋃C⋃D
P = U – (N ⋃ M)

And because each of these three sets is composed of the union of other
sets, we can understand each of the sets defined by the existence of a
material fact going to degree to be a subset of a set defining the degree of
crime committed by the defendant, which in turn is a subset of the set of
the universe of all theft offenses.
Graphically, we can represent this universe of theft offenses as
follows:
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Figure 9

One feature of our graphical representation bears mention, and
perhaps qualification. Figure 9 assumes that there is no intersection
between the sets defining material facts going to degree, and therefore
no intersection between the sets defining degrees of theft offenses. For
example, this graphic model assumes that there is no case that falls
within both set F (theft of a firearm) and set A (theft of property with
value between $50 and $500). This assumption is not necessarily
correct—indeed, it almost certainly is not. We could revise our model of
this universe of discourse to account for the possibility that these two
sets would intersect—that firearms worth less than $500, or even less
than $50, could be stolen. But then we would require some basis for
determining which degree the offense of stealing such a firearm would
fall into—whether, for example, the theft of a firearm worth $450 is a
third-degree felony, or a misdemeanor, or both, or neither. Thus, the
fact that our parent sets distinguishing one legal category from
another—in this case, degrees of theft offenses—are composed of
subsets that may intersect—in this case, sets defined by the existence of
material facts going to degree—presents the potential for logical
inconsistency in our model.
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The Model Penal Code expressly contemplates the possibility that a
single set of facts (or state of the world) might give rise to multiple
offenses, or multiple degrees of an offense, simultaneously. It further
seems to provide that a prosecutor has discretion to charge all crimes
supported by the facts, even if this results in charging multiple degrees
of the same offense, while the jury may only convict a defendant of one
grade of offense “included” within the charged offense 70—a construction
that will be recognized as having affinities with the set-theoretic notion
of inclusion. Thus, in the case of lesser included offenses, the Model
Penal Code provides explicit strategies for navigating the logical
inconsistency that might result from the intersection of sets defining
different grades of property crime, and treats these strategies as legal
rules in their own right.
The important point for the present is not that the Model Penal
Code solution is the correct strategy for dealing with the potential for
logical inconsistency in a set-theoretic model of an area of legal
doctrine, but that some such strategy is required. When two sets that
correspond to categories defined by legal rules intersect, and those rules
dictate mutually incompatible outcomes of a particular case, some
additional content is required in order to avoid logical inconsistency.
Again, we will more fully explore the possible strategies for avoiding
such inconsistency in the following Part. Before doing so, we continue
to fill out our basic model of legal reasoning and analysis by looking to
the last of our set-theoretic operations: intersection.
3.

Intersection: Legal Elements and Multi-Pronged Rules

Intersection is the set-theoretic function most intimately tied to
another important type of legal structure: the concept of “elements” of a
claim, defense, or legal test. Consider the elements of the tort claim
analogous to the crime of theft discussed above: conversion. One of the
pithier recitations of the elements of this claim states them as follows:
“(1) the plaintiff has a property interest and (2) the defendant deprives
the plaintiff of that interest.” 71 While more complex formulations of the

70
71

MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (AM. LAW INST. 1962).
Lassen v. First Bank Eden Prairie, 514 N.W.2d 831, 838 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994).
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conversion tort abound, 72 this one will do to illustrate the role of
intersection in our model.
When we are dealing with legal tests framed in terms of “elements,”
we are typically invoking notions of both logical sufficiency and logical
necessity. When we say that certain elements are necessary to a legal
claim, we mean that the absence of any of those elements would be fatal
to that claim. When we say that certain elements are sufficient to
establish a legal claim, we mean that if each and every one of those
elements is proven, then the absence of any additional fact will not cause
the claim to fail. Thus, when we say that our two criteria are elements of
a cause of action for conversion, what we mean is that it is necessary for
both of them to be present in a particular state of the world subject to a
legal dispute in order for us to conclude that the defendant has
committed that tort, 73 and that the presence of both of these elements is
a sufficient basis to conclude that the defendant committed that tort. 74 In

72 See, e.g., G.S. Rasmussen & Associates, Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906
(9th Cir. 1992) (“In California, conversion has three elements: ownership or right to possession
of property, wrongful disposition of the property right and damages.”); Cirrincione v. Johnson,
703 N.E.2d 67, 70 (Ill. 1998) (“To prove conversion, a plaintiff must establish that (1) he has a
right to the property; (2) he has an absolute and unconditional right to the immediate
possession of the property; (3) he made a demand for possession; and (4) the defendant
wrongfully and without authorization assumed control, dominion, or ownership over the
property.”); Vigilant Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hous. Auth. of City of El Paso, 660 N.E.2d 1121, 1126
(N.Y. 1995) (“Conversion is the unauthorized assumption and exercise of the right of
ownership over goods belonging to another to the exclusion of the owner’s rights.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
73 Thus, in jurisdictions where conversion of intangible property is actionable and where
damage is an element of the cause of action, a plaintiff who shows ownership of the intangible
property and the defendant’s taking of a copy of that property nevertheless cannot establish a
conversion claim if the defendant destroys his copy of the plaintiff’s property prior to making
any use of it. See, e.g., News Am. Mktg. In-Store, Inc. v. Marquis, 862 A.2d 837, 848 (Conn.
App. Ct. 2004), aff’d, 885 A.2d 758 (Conn. 2005).
74 Thus, the fact that a conversion defendant lacked any bad-faith intent—or mens rea—is
generally no barrier to a conversion claim. Deming v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 905 A.2d 623,
639–40 (Conn. 2006) (“[S]tatutory theft requires an intent to deprive another of his
property . . . [t]herefore, statutory theft requires a plaintiff to prove the additional element of
intent over and above what he or she must demonstrate to prove conversion.”); Ahles v. Aztec
Enters., Inc., 502 N.Y.S.2d 821, 822 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986) (“Intent to possess another’s
property is not an essential element of conversion.”); DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN
M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 62 (2d ed. 2018 update) (“The intent required to show
conversion is exactly analogous to the intent required to prove a trespass to land. In neither
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other words, the tort is established by a conjunction of these elements,
and as discussed above, the logical relation of conjunction is expressed
in set theory through the concept of intersection. 75
Once again, we can develop this concept both formally and
graphically. Consider a universe of discourse consisting of states of the
world in which someone has a legally cognizable property interest in a
particular object of interest. Let us further define two sets within this
universe of discourse by reference to the parties to a legal dispute. Let P
be the set of all cases in which the plaintiff has a property interest in the
object of interest, and let Q be the set of all cases in which the defendant
has prevented others from exercising control over the object of interest.
We can understand viable conversion claims as those that fall within the
intersection of these two sets:
C=P∩Q
Graphically, we can represent this simplified model of conversion
as follows:

case is the defendant’s bad motive or good faith ordinarily relevant except on the question of
punitive damages.”).
75 There are computational theories of legal reasoning that take a similar approach to more
complex modeling problems by conceiving of cases as collections of “factors”—facts relevant to
a rule directing a disposition. See generally KEVIN D. ASHLEY, MODELING LEGAL ARGUMENTS:
REASONING WITH CASES AND HYPOTHETICALS (1991); John F. Horty, Rules and Reasons in the
Theory of Precedent, 17 LEGAL THEORY 1 (2011).
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Figure 10

Thus, property interests that the plaintiff has in an object of
interest, but which the defendant has not prevented the plaintiff from
exercising control over, do not give rise to a conversion claim: The fact
that you stole my car doesn’t mean I can sue you for conversion of the
bicycle I still have. Likewise, objects that the defendant prevents others
from enjoying will not ground a conversion claim by plaintiffs who have
no property interest in those objects: You can’t sue me for conversion
for driving my own car, or even your neighbor’s car, no matter how
much you might disapprove of my conduct, or wish the car were yours.
Again, we can present various factual scenarios graphically as part of
our set-theoretic model of the relevant doctrine:
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Figure 11

As should be apparent, the predicates of these two sets are not
especially informative. What it means for a plaintiff to have a property
interest in a thing, and what it means for a defendant to prevent
someone from exercising control over a thing, are not questions that our
model can necessarily answer. And while this problem is not equally
vexing for all predicates that might serve as intensional definitions of
sets of legal interest—for example, “x is a natural person more than 18
years of age”—it is quite a common concern in legal analysis. To solve
such a problem, the common law often turns from intensional to
extensional definition—a mode of reasoning that will complete our basic
model of set theory in legal analysis.
C.

Common-Law Rule-Building: Extensional Definition

So far, our set-theoretic model of legal analysis has relied on
intensionally defined sets. A legal authority (a statute or binding
precedent) announces a rule that purports to define a category;
subsequent cases are then evaluated for membership in that category.
But in common-law systems, cases are not decided purely by deductive

Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete)

2066

7/15/2019 4:26 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2029

reasoning from abstract rules of law encapsulated in legal authorities.
They are also decided inductively, based on extrapolation of rules from
the facts and outcomes of analogous precedents. In terms of legal
theory, this is the interpretivist exercise of “discover[ing] principles that
fit, not only the particular precedent to which some litigant directs his
attention, but all other judicial decisions within [the court’s] general
jurisdiction.”76 In our set-theoretic model, we can understand it as an
exercise in extensional set definition. 77 Importantly, this exercise
interacts with the previously discussed exercise of determining whether
a particular state of the world falls within an intensional definition.
Moreover, this interaction between intensional and extensional set
definition is recursive: intensionally defined rules guide the
determination of cases, and the determination of cases goes on to
inform the construction (and reformation) of intensional definitions.
This recursive dynamic is nicely illustrated in the Ninth Circuit
opinion in Kremen v. Cohen. 78 Fortuitously, this case about conversion
of a domain name also concerns an issue left open in the previous
Section: how we might give content to a vague or ambiguous intensional
definition such as “a property right of the plaintiff” in a marginal case.
In Kremen, the dispute turned in part on a discrete legal issue: whether
an internet domain name is “property” for purposes of the California
law of conversion. To answer this question, Judge Kozinski, 79 writing for
the panel, considered two available intensional predicates for the
relevant definition of “property” as applied to intangibles. One earlier
Ninth Circuit case defined “property” as including “every intangible
benefit and prerogative susceptible of possession or disposition.” 80 In
contrast, the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that intangible rights

Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1094 (1975) (emphasis added).
Schauer’s discussion of the common law, for example, includes a discussion of the
extensional definition of rules based on the decisions of cases. SCHAUER, supra note 9, at 183–
85.
78 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2003).
79 In 2009, Judge Kozinski was admonished by a judicial disciplinary panel for maintaining
a publicly accessible server that included sexually explicit material. In 2017, he abruptly
resigned after being accused of sexual misconduct by numerous women, including former law
clerks.
80 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030 (quoting Downing v. Mun. Court, 198 P.2d 923, 926 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1948)).
76
77
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could be property subject to conversion “[w]here there is conversion of
a document in which intangible rights are merged” or where the
defendant “effectively prevents the exercise of intangible rights of the
kind customarily merged in a document,” and further explains that
“[a]n intangible is merged in a document when . . . the right to the
immediate possession of a chattel . . . is represented by [the] document,
or when an intangible obligation [is] represented by [the] document,
which is regarded as equivalent to the obligation.” 81 The choice of either
of these definitions could be outcome determinative. After all, control
over a domain name—which is no more or less than the system of
distributed computer data records and architectural conventions that
allows a particular string of text to uniquely identify a computer on the
internet82—might
be
an
“intangible
benefit
susceptible
of . . . disposition,” but nevertheless might not be “merged in a
document.”
We can model this choice using the set-theoretic tools developed
above. We can first illustrate the relevant universe of discourse as
divided into our two complementary sets, π and ∆, corresponding to a
judgment for the plaintiff and a judgment for the defendant,
respectively. Given the Kremen court’s determination that a conversion
claim under California law requires the plaintiff to show “ownership or
right to possession of property, wrongful disposition of the property
right and damages,” 83 we can define the set corresponding to a
judgment for the plaintiff as the intersection of three sets corresponding
to these three elements. Taken together, we have the following formal
definitions:

81 Id. at 1031 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1965)).
82 See id. at 1033–35; see also INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE, RFC-1035: DOMAIN
NAMES – IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIFICATION (Nov. 1987), https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1035
[https://perma.cc/KLH8-T393].
83 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1029 (quoting G.S. Rasmussen & Assocs., Inc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv.,
Inc., 958 F.2d 896, 906 (9th Cir. 1992)).
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f(x) = x is a property right owned by the plaintiff
P = {x: f(x)}
Q = {x: x is a property right wrongfully disposed of by the defendant}84
R = {x: x is an act of the defendant that causes damage to the plaintiff}
π = P ∩ (Q ∩ R)
∆ = (U – π) = π'
We can also represent this universe of discourse graphically as follows:
Figure 12

The main dispute in Kremen was over the size (or scope) of P. As
the discussion above indicates, at least two alternative understandings of
the predicate for P were available. We can amend our model to account
for these alternative predicates:

84 Obviously, we could also define Q as the intersection of two other sets: property rights
disposed of by the defendant and property rights the defendant has no right to dispose of. But
doing so adds no clarity to the analysis in this case. It might be an important distinction,
however, in cases where the defendant asserts such a right (for example, if the defendant asserts
permission, ownership, necessity, or some other form of justification or excuse for the
disposition).
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g(x) = x is “any intangible benefit and prerogative susceptible of
possession or disposition” owned by the plaintiff
P1 = {x: g(x)}
h(x) = x is a right to tangible property owned by the plaintiff
i(x) = x is an intangible right owned by the plaintiff which is
“represented by a document” 85
P2 = {x: (h(x) ∨i(x))}
π1 = (P1 ∩ Q) ∩ R
∆1 = (U – π1) = π1'
π2 = (P2 ∩ Q) ∩ R
∆2 = (U – π2) = π2'
Judge Kozinski seemed to be operating under the premise that the
facts of Kremen would satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s definition of property,
but not the Restatement’s definition. 86 This is a consequential—and
perhaps contestable—premise, which we will not examine here, saving
such evaluation of membership relations for further investigation in
Part III. For now, Judge Kozinski’s premise is mainly relevant in that it
provides some additional propositions for our model:
k = Kremen v. Cohen
k ∈ P1
k ∉ P2
Given these revised and additional definitions, we can revise our
graphic representation of the doctrine of conversion at issue in the case:

85 This predicate is the most appropriate for the analysis that immediately follows, but we
could obviously draw further distinctions concerning the alleged wrongful act of the defendant,
such as whether the defendant interfered with the document representing the intangible right
or merely with the right itself.
86 Kremen, 337 F.3d at 1030–31.
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Figure 13

If—as our model suggests—the outcome of Kremen depended on
whether P1 or P2 is the appropriate category of “property” for purposes
of establishing a California conversion claim, Judge Kozinski’s task was
to decide which category was required by California law. To do so, he
engaged in the classic common-law exercise of reviewing analogous
precedent. Three cases decided by California courts particularly drove
the analysis. Payne v. Elliot, 87 the only California Supreme Court case on
the issue, stated that the action for trover (the common-law predecessor
of conversion) was “a remedy for the conversion of every species of
personal property,” and therefore concluded that shares in a
corporation could be converted even without conversion of the actual
stock certificates themselves. 88 Olschewski v. Hudson, in contrast, stated
that “the proceeding in conversion was not intended to reach so
intangible, uncertain, and indefinite a property right” as the interest the
plaintiff in that case was claiming as property: a laundry route. 89 In
87
88
89

54 Cal. 339 (1880).
Id. at 341.
Olschewski v. Hudson, 262 P. 43, 45–46 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1927).
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doing so, Olschewski remarked that Payne’s categorical statement about
the scope of conversion was “too broad” and “unnecessary to the
determination of the issue in that case,” which could have been resolved
on grounds that “[s]hares of stock are represented by certificates which
are evidence of a definite interest in the assets of a company” and are
therefore “tangible.” 90 Olschewski thus relied on a rule quite similar to
that of the Restatement. But a later case, Palm Springs-La Quinta
Development Co. v. Kieberk Corp., 91 distinguished Olschewski to uphold
a conversion claim against a defendant who wrongfully took possession
of a large set of index cards recording customer information, and
subsequently lost or destroyed a large number of those cards. The Palm
Springs court’s justification for departing from Olschewski seemed to
rest on the fact that the physical index cards themselves were tangible in
a way that the goodwill and customer lists of a laundry service were
not. 92
Based on these and other cases, Judge Kozinski drew distinctions
between the intensional definitions provided by the language of the
reviewed opinions, and the extensional definitions that could be inferred
by grouping cases according to their outcomes. With respect to Payne,
for example, he noted that “[w]hile Payne’s outcome might be
reconcilable with the Restatement, its rationale certainly is not: It
recognized conversion of shares, not because they are customarily
represented by share certificates, but because they are a species of
personal property and, perforce, protected.” 93 Olschewski presented the
90 Id. at 46. Another laundry-route case relied on Olschewski to arrive at the same
conclusion. Adkins v. Model Laundry Co., 268 P. 939, 942 (Cal. Ct. App. 1928) (“[T]here is no
such property right in the intangible interest of an exclusive privilege to collect laundry or sell
newspapers in a specific district, which will authorize damages in a suit at law for conversion or
trover.”).
91 115 P.2d 548 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1941).
92 Id. at 552 (“The defendant in [Olschewski] was not charged with converting an index list
of customers. He was charged with selling the good-will of a business in a specified district.
This court merely held that was an intangible property right which is not susceptible of
conversion. In the present case the appellants were charged with damages for destroying and
appropriating tangible personal property consisting of a cabinet of lead cards containing the
names and valuable information regarding prospective and actual purchasers of real property,
contrary to the express terms of a written contract. There is a clear distinction between these
cases.”).
93 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003).
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opposite problem. The language of that opinion raised “a plausible
argument that California follows the Restatement.” 94 But this argument
was undermined by comparison of the result in Olschewski with the
result in Palm Springs. As Judge Kozinski put it:
Palm Springs and Olschewski are reconcilable on their facts—the
former involved conversion of the document itself while the latter
did not. But this distinction can’t be squared with the Restatement.
The plaintiff in Palm Springs recovered damages for the value of his
intangibles. But if those intangibles were merged in the index
cards . . . the plaintiffs in Olschewski . . . should have recovered [as
well] . . . [L]aundry routes surely are customarily written down
somewhere. 95

In attempting to reconcile these three cases, Judge Kozinski placed
the greatest weight not on the rationales (or rules) announced in the
judicial opinions he reviewed, but on the correlation of their underlying
facts with their outcomes. Specifically, he tried to determine whether
that correlation was captured by one of the available intensional
definitions under consideration. If Olschewski held for the defendant on
a rationale that was inconsistent with the outcome of Palm Springs, and
if Payne held for the plaintiff on a rationale that was inconsistent with
the outcome of Olschewski, both rationales should be disregarded in
favor of a new rationale that can explain the outcomes in all three cases
by reference to their underlying facts:
To the extent Olschewski endorses the strict merger rule, it is against
the weight of authority. . . . Were it necessary to settle the issue once
and for all, we would toe the line of Payne and hold that conversion
is “a remedy for the conversion of every species of personal
property.” But we need not do so to resolve this case. Assuming
arguendo that California retains some vestigial merger requirement,
it is clearly minimal, and at most requires only some connection to a
document or tangible object—not representation of the owner’s
intangible interest in the strict Restatement sense. 96

94
95
96

Id. at 1032.
Id.
Id. at 1033 (internal citation omitted).
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Having thus (re)defined the relevant scope of a “property right,” Judge
Kozinski went on to conclude that a domain name is sufficiently
connected to a “document”—specifically, information stored in a
collection of electronic records comprising the Domain Name System—
to satisfy his definition and thus make out a case for conversion. 97
We are now at last in a position to model the foregoing exercise in
extensional set building both formally and graphically. We have three
new cases to categorize, and must also formulate a new predicate for the
set corresponding to the appropriate definition of “property.” Let us call
that set P3. We thus have the following formal definitions:
e = Payne v. Eliot
o = Olschewski v. Hudson
s = Palm Springs Development Co. v. Kieberk Corp.
P3 = {x: (h(x) ∨j(x))}
e ∈ P3
s ∈ P3
k ∈ P3
o ∉ P3

Our task now is to formulate the as-yet-unspecified predicate j(x),
which defines the type of intangible right that is “property” under
California conversion law. Because we are proceeding by extensional
definition, it may be most helpful to turn here to our graphical model,
focusing in on the area of interest. If we map our cases according to the
relationship between the intangible right at issue and some document
(with placement closer to the center of P implying a closer relationship
to a traditional document), we might arrive at something like this:

97

Id. at 1033–34.
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Figure 14

The task, then, is to identify a predicate j(x) that is satisfied by e, k,
and s, but is not satisfied by o. Judge Kozinski’s solution to this problem
can be formally expressed as follows:
j(x) = x is an intangible right having some minimal connection to a
document or tangible object
This type of exercise—organizing cases according to their
outcomes and identifying some common feature that is present in all
cases with one outcome but absent from all cases with the opposing
outcome—is the hallmark of common-law reasoning by analogy and
distinction. It should be familiar to most lawyers, and is among the key
skills to be mastered by law students. But conceiving of this classic
exercise in set-theoretic terms highlights some important points.
First: The relationship between rules and cases is both dynamic and
recursive. Announced intensional rules inform the outcomes of
individual cases, but extensional definitions based on the outcomes of
those individual cases may then in turn qualify, modify, and potentially
even overturn those intensional rules, and so on and so forth. This
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recursive process generates constant, dynamic refinement and
reformulation of the universe of discourse of legal doctrines. 98
Second: Judge Kozinski gives extensional definition precedence
over intensional definition. Indeed, his effort to reconcile Payne with
inferior California court opinions suggests that this precedence may be
more important in his view than the transmission of intensional rules
via the hierarchies of appellate authority. We can understand this
preference for extensional definition as a reflection of Dworkin’s
observation about the notion of “fit”: that a judge “does not satisfy his
duty to show that his decision is consistent with established principles,
and therefore fair, if the principles he cites as established are themselves
inconsistent with other decisions that his court also proposes to
uphold.” 99 As in the context of lesser included offenses, a conflict
between two applicable rules requires some strategy for resolution. The
interpretivist concepts of fit and justification appear to constitute
another such strategy: one that purports to resolve contradictions
between intensional definitions from the text of judicial opinions and
extensional definitions derived from the juxtaposition of multiple prior
judicial decisions in favor of the latter. Again, the point is not that Judge
Kozinski’s (or Dworkin’s) strategy is the right one, but that some such
strategy is required.
Third: The prioritization of one rule over another can be
implemented in a number of formally distinct ways, with differing
implications for the legal universe of discourse in which the conflict of
rules arises. As Judge Kozinski recognized, he could simply have
followed the intensional definition of “property” extracted from the
Payne opinion, and evaluated Kremen’s claimed property interest
against that definition. This would have entailed a conclusion that
Olschewski was wrongly decided, and reordered the membership
relations between the discussed cases and the intensionally-defined set
containing them. Instead of doing so, Judge Kozinski altered the
inclusion relationships between the sets defined by intensional
predicates from earlier judicial opinions and the sets defining the
outcomes of conversion cases, adding a new intensionally-defined set of
98 Cf. Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572–73 (1987) (noting that
precedent is both “forward-looking” and “backward-looking”).
99 Dworkin, supra note 76, at 1094.
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his own to the universe of discourse. Rather than altering the
membership relations between the precedents and rule-based sets, Judge
Kozinski altered the inclusion relationships between rule-based sets and
the outcomes of adjudication. These strategies are distinct, not in their
result for the particular case (Kremen would have prevailed either way),
but as a matter of logical form. Even so, as precedents in their own right,
opinions implementing such strategies make different claims on the
future legal universe of discourse.
This type of formal difference in the behavior of legal actors
becomes more complex when we consider that not all legal authorities
lend themselves to this type of extensional set-building. In particular,
regulations, statutes, and constitutions cannot be analyzed
extensionally, because they consist solely of intensional definitions.
They have no facts, no outcomes, to feed into the recursive process of
extensional construction. Still, when a conflict arises among such
intensional definitions—whether derived from non-caselaw authorities
or from the language of judicial opinions—there may be other ways of
avoiding a logically inconsistent set-theoretic model of the universe of
discourse subject to those authorities. Mapping out those strategies—
and their implications—is the project of the rest of this Article.
III. FORMAL STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING CONTRADICTION
The set-theoretic tools developed in the previous Part may be
helpful in formalizing ordinary legal reasoning, but if that were all they
achieved they would mainly be of interest to only a small set of theorists,
educators, and (perhaps) law students. After all, most lawyers and
judges get by perfectly well in their professional lives without conceiving
of their arguments and analyses in terms of predicate logic or Venn
diagrams. In this Part, however, I will argue that the tools developed in
the previous Part are necessary to adequately understand an important
feature of legal practice that is intimately connected to the process of
common-law doctrinal development and change.
Specifically, I propose that legal actors are free to respond in
particular cases to the constraints imposed by conflicting applicable
legal authorities by resorting to at least three formally distinct types of
arguments: (1) arguments about the relation of those authorities to the
facts of particular cases; (2) arguments about the relation of those
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authorities to one another; or (3) arguments about the relation of those
authorities to adjudicative outcomes. The distinctions among these
types of arguments map to discrete aspects of the set-theoretic model
developed in the previous part, but not necessarily to discrete features of
the natural language in which legal authorities are expressed or to the
substance of the rules embodied in those authorities. Thus,
understanding the set-theoretic model of legal reasoning allows for
deeper appreciation of the choices made by legal actors in advocacy and
adjudication, and raises theoretical issues separate from typical
jurisprudential concerns founded on the ambiguity (or “open
texture” 100) of language. This Part focuses on the first of these issues—
understanding how strategies for resolving doctrinal conflicts differ, and
how those differences relate to changes in doctrine over time. The next
Part will address the second issue: how a formal understanding of the
diverse strategies for negotiating doctrinal conflict relates to legal
theoretical debates—particularly those focusing on the determinacy (or
lack thereof) of law.
A.

Competing Predicates and Logical Contradictions: Outlining the
Problem

Distinctions among the logical forms of strategies for resolving
doctrinal conflicts are best illustrated with a simple model of
contradiction and constraint: the apparent applicability of two legal
rules requiring opposite outcomes to the facts of a single case. We first
addressed this possibility explicitly when discussing lesser included
criminal offenses; 101 we will see shortly that our discussion of subleases
and assignments presented a similar problem. 102 When presented with
such a conflict of authority, a legal actor may struggle to maintain the
logical consistency of a body of doctrine. The resolution of that conflict
requires legal actors to manipulate the logical structure of the legal
universe of discourse, and there are multiple ways of doing so. In short,

100 HART, supra note 8, at 127–28; see generally Frederick Schauer, On the Open Texture of
Law, 87 GRAZER PHILOSOPHISCHE STUDIEN 197 (2013).
101 Supra Section II.B.2.
102 Supra Section II.B.1.
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legal actors have significant discretion in the formal strategies they use
in arguing or adjudicating cases.
To see how the conflict of legal authorities generates multiple
possible formally distinct resolution strategies, let us consider some
examples from intellectual property law. Intellectual property lawyers
and scholars often group legal rules in the field into four distinct groups:
validity, infringement, defenses, and remedies. 103 Questions of validity—
whether someone has a protectable intellectual property right or not—
particularly lend themselves to set-theoretical analysis.
Let us suppose that when asking whether an individual has a valid
intellectual property right or not (which we may for present purposes
consider a binary proposition 104), we are asking whether the intangible
asset they claim satisfies certain predicates for set membership.
Specifically (following the analysis of the previous Part), we are asking
whether the intangible asset is a member of a set defined as the
intersection of other sets, which are in turn defined by the applicable
legal rules concerning validity. For copyrights, we ask whether the
claimed right is protectable subject matter (i.e., a work of authorship), 105
whether it is original, 106 and whether it is fixed in a tangible medium of
expression 107—an intersection of three sets. For trademarks, we ask
103 Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Scope, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2197, 2200 & n.1
(2016) (“Intellectual property (IP) law doctrines fall into three basic categories: validity,
infringement, and defenses. Virtually every significant legal doctrine in IP is either about
whether the plaintiff has a valid IP right that the law will recognize (validity); whether what the
defendant did violates that right (infringement); or whether the defendant is somehow
privileged to violate that right (defenses). . . . If the IP owner prevails, there are also issues about
the remedy awarded.”).
104 Lemley and McKenna argue that many intellectual property law cases turn not on the
validity of an intellectual property right but on its scope—a non-binary proposition. See
generally id. While this is true, it is always possible to reformulate the non-binary question of a
right’s scope as a binary question: i.e., “does the plaintiff have a right of this scope or not”? See
supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text. Importantly, this is a formal move, not a substantive
one—it reframes the question in such a way as to allow clearer modeling of the applicable
analysis according to the tools used in this Article, but still requires some substantive content as
to the appropriate scope of intellectual property rights, and moreover requires some external
reason for selecting a right of the posited scope as the appropriate subject for analysis.
105 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1990).
106 Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345–47 (1991).
107 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010); Cartoon Network LP v. CSC Holdings, Inc., 536 F.3d 121, 129 (2d
Cir. 2008) (“[T]o determine whether a work is ‘fixed’ in a given medium, the statutory language
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whether the claimed mark is protectable subject matter, 108 whether it is
distinctive, 109 and whether the claimant has used it in commerce 110—
another intersection of three sets. For patents, we ask whether the
claimed invention is patentable subject matter, novel, useful, nonobvious, and has been adequately described in an enabling disclosure—
an intersection of five sets. 111 To reiterate: This last example envisions
that inventions that can be categorized as to their membership in the set
defined as the intersection of five other sets, themselves defined by the
substantive legal criteria of patentability. Inventions within that area of
intersection are entitled to patent protection—we may say they are
elements of the set of patentable inventions—while those that are
outside that set are unpatentable (or invalid if a patent has erroneously
issued for them).
Moreover, each of the five criteria for patentability (whose
intersection determines a patent’s validity) may be further defined via
set-theoretic operations. Consider patentable subject matter. Section
101 of the Patent Act defines patentable subject matter as any “process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 112 We can express
this rule formally using the tools developed in the previous Part. First,
we must establish some definitions:

directs us to ask not only 1) whether a work is ‘embodied’ in that medium, but also 2) whether
it is embodied in the medium ‘for a period of more than transitory duration.’”).
108 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 162 (1995) (“[T]he Lanham
Act . . . says that trademarks ‘includ[e] any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof.’ [15 U.S.C.] § 1127. Since human beings might use as a ‘symbol’ or ‘device’ almost
anything at all that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not
restrictive.”).
109 Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 768 (1992) (holding that to be
protected, a trademark must be “capable of distinguishing the applicant’s goods from those of
others”).
110 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (“The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and distinguish his or
her goods.” (emphasis added)); Hydro-Dynamics, Inc. v. George Putnam & Co., 811 F.2d 1470,
1473 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The requirements of both adoption and use devolve from the common
law; trademark rights in the United States are acquired by such adoption and use, not by
registration.”).
111 35 U.S.C.A §§ 101–103; 112 (West 2015).
112 35 U.S.C.A § 101 (West 2015). To simplify this illustrative example we will omit the
patentability of improvements to existing inventions.
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P(x) = x is a process
Q(x) = x is a machine
R(x) = x is a manufacture
S(x) = x is a composition of matter
A = {x : P(x)}
B = {x : Q(x)}
C = {x : R(x)}
D = {x : S(x)}
Now let us imagine a set E representing the set of all inventions
that qualify as patentable subject matter. Given our prior definitions and
the text of Section 101 we can construct E as a union of several other
sets:
E=A⋃B⋃C⋃D

The statutory definition of patentable subject matter is
inclusionary, i.e., it tells us what is patentable subject matter. One might
therefore think that everything outside this definition is not patentable
subject matter; i.e., that the complement E' would be a complete and
adequate formal description of subject matter that is unpatentable under
Section 101. But it isn’t. And this is because the universe of discourse
regarding patentable subject matter includes more legal sets than those
encompassed by the statutory definition of Section 101.
As Justice Breyer noted in Mayo Collaborative Services v.
Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,113 “The [Supreme] Court has long held
that [Section 101] contains an important implicit exception. ‘[L]aws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas’ are not patentable.”114
This is, obviously, an exclusionary definition: It tells us what is not
patentable subject matter. And we might ask whether this definition is
equivalent to our previously derived description of unpatentable subject
matter, E'.
All scholars and practitioners of patent law know that these two
definitions are not equivalent, and even those unschooled in this area of
doctrine will immediately understand why. The non-equivalence is
signaled by Justice Breyer’s use of the word “exception” in Mayo. But
113
114

566 U.S. 66 (2012).
Id. at 70.
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formalizing what this exception means with respect to Section 101—
how the inclusionary and exclusionary definitions interact as a matter of
logical form—will help us understand the value of set-theoretic analysis
for managing conflicting intensional predicates. Let us construct a
formal definition of unpatentable subject matter under the Supreme
Court’s exclusionary definition and attempt to integrate it with our
formalization of the inclusionary definition of Section 101:
T(x) = x is a law of nature
V(x) = x is a natural phenomenon
W(x) = x is an abstract idea
F = {x : T(x)}
G = {x : V(x)}
H = {x : W(x)}
Now let us suppose some set K that will represent the set of all
unpatentable subject matter under the Supreme Court’s definition as
stated in Mayo:
K=F⋃G⋃H

The question we are trying to answer is whether either of the
following logically equivalent assertions are true:
E = K'
K = E'
That is, we want to know whether the inclusionary definition of
Section 101 and the exclusionary definition from Supreme Court
caselaw are complements in the set-theoretic sense of the word.
And now the problem is clear: These two definitions are not
complements. Moreover, the reason why they are not complements is
important—it is because some of the subsets of E have non-empty
intersections with some of the subsets of K. We can see such intersection
in two lines of cases. The first involves cases such as Parke-Davis & Co.
v. H.K. Mulford Co. 115 and Association of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., 116 in which certain isolated and purified biological
products are—at least arguably—elements both of set D (compositions

115
116

189 F. 95 (2d Cir. 1911) (Learned Hand, J.).
569 U.S. 576 (2013).
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of matter) and set G (natural phenomena). The second involves cases
such as Bilski v. Kappos 117 and Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 118 in which
certain computerized methods useful in the finance industry are—at
least arguably—elements both of set A (processes) and set H (abstract
ideas). These examples of objects that are elements of subsets of both E
and K render the complementarity of E and K logically impossible:
complements are necessarily disjoint sets. 119
To illustrate the same point graphically, imagine some object n that
is an element of both sets A and H—i.e., it is both a process and an
abstract idea. We can represent the resulting universe of discourse as
follows:

561 U.S. 593 (2010).
573 U.S. 208 (2014).
119 We can establish this by assuming that E and K are complements and then proving a
contradiction based on the existence of an object that is an element of subsets of both E and K.
Formally we may express our proof as follows, given a universe of discourse including the sets
as defined in the text and some object n that is both a process and an abstract idea:
117
118

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)

Let E = K'
E=U–K
E = {x : (x ∈ U) ∧ (x ∉ K)}
¬∃(x)[(x ∈ E) ∧ (x ∈ K)]
(n ∈ A) ∧ ( n ∈ H)
A⊆E
H⊆K
(n ∈ E) ∧( n ∈ K)
⊥
¬ ( E = K')

(Assumption)
(Definition of Complementarity; 1)
(Definition of Set Subtraction)
(Definition of Set Membership; 3)
(Given)
(Given)
(Given)
(Definition of Inclusion; 5, 6, 7)
(6, 8)
(1, 9)
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Figure 15

By the definition of the relation of inclusion, n will be a member of both
E (which includes its subset A) and K (which includes its subset H). But
if this is true, E and K cannot be complements, because complements
can have no elements in common.
Thus, treating the inclusionary statutory definition and the
exclusionary common-law definition of patentable subject matter as
mutually consistent—i.e., as set-theoretic complements—is logically
untenable. If processes are patentable, but abstract ideas are not
patentable, any object that is both a process and an abstract idea yields
the above-described logical contradiction—it must be both patentable
and not patentable at the same time. Indeed, we can generalize this
understanding. Expressed as a matter of set theory, we may say that any
time two definitions for a legal set exist—one inclusionary and one
exclusionary—if the definitions do not define disjoint sets they will
generate logical contradictions. The question then arises how to avoid
such contradictions. We will consider three strategies for doing so: (1)
the Trump Card, (2) the No True Scotsman, and (3) the Tertium Quid.
B.

The Trump Card

As suggested earlier, the patent lawyer has a ready answer to the
accusation of logical inconsistency in patentable subject matter doctrine.
This answer is implied in the recitation of the exclusionary definition
from Mayo quoted above: that the rule of Section 101 “contains an
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important implicit exception.” 120 That is, the Supreme Court may be
understood as saying that its definition is an exception to the otherwise
applicable statutory definition of patentable subject matter: that it carves
out some territory that would otherwise be covered by Section 101. Put
another way, the Court can be understood to be saying that its
definition takes precedence over the text of Section 101—that in the
event of a conflict between the two, the Court’s exclusionary definition
applies and Congress’s inclusionary definition does not.
This move is the first of our strategies for resolving a logical
contradiction presented by competing intensional definitions of
applicable doctrinal categories. Let us call it the Trump Card. The
Trump Card move embraces the intersection between two subsets at
issue, and concludes that one takes precedence over—or “trumps”—the
other. For such a move to work, we must revise our model of the
universe of discourse defined by the applicable legal rules. For example,
we must now recognize that a process is only patentable subject matter
if it is also not an abstract idea.
We have seen this move before. A similar logical structure
undergirded our model of the law of sublease and assignment. There, we
had to account for the possibility that a sublessee might assume the
covenants of the primary lease, and thereby become directly liable to the
primary landlord. 121 Recall that in that instance, an assumption of
covenants by a sublessee provided an exception to the rule that
sublessees cannot be held directly liable. The fact that we encountered
the same formal structure of doctrine in a body of law that we modeled
via the set-theoretic operation of subtraction suggests that subtraction
could be a useful tool not only for modeling settled doctrine, but for
resolving contradictions among competing relevant legal authorities if
and when they are first presented.
But set subtraction is not our only option for modeling the Trump
Card. Formally we could express the move in another way. Let us return
to the patentable subject matter example. One possible way of applying
the Trump Card to this example would be to refine our predicates for
patentable (and unpatentable) subject matter using the logical operation
of conjunction with a negated premise. Thus:
120
121

Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 70 (2012).
Supra Section II.B.1.
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A = {x: P(x) ∧ ¬W(x)}
H = {x: W(x)}

This approach does capture the logic of the Trump Card, in that a
subject matter that satisfies predicate P (i.e., is a process) will still be
categorized as unpatentable if it also satisfies predicate W (i.e., is an
abstract idea). However, revising our predicates in this way may be an
insufficient basis for a comprehensive model of this particular body of
doctrine if our intensional definitions—inclusionary and exclusionary—
are not exhaustive of the universe of discourse. That is, we might still
wonder whether a subject matter that is neither within the statute’s
inclusionary definitions nor within the judicially developed exclusionary
definitions is patentable or not.
The doctrinal answer appears to be that it is not—that even if a
patent claim does not fall within one of the judicial exceptions, so long
as it is not within one of the statute’s inclusionary categories it will still
be unpatentable. Examples of such subject matter include a company, an
arrangement of printed matter, or a collection of data. 122 Accounting for
this possibility in our model of the doctrine, we must imagine the
relevant universe of discourse as being divided into patentable subject
matter—which includes things that are within the inclusionary statutory
definitions but not within the judicial exclusionary definitions—and
unpatentable subject matter—which includes everything else, including
but not limited to things that are within the judicial exclusionary
definitions. 123 In other words, it requires us to frame our two binary
outcomes—patentable versus unpatentable subject matter—in terms of
the set theoretic concept of complementation. Patentable subject matter
is defined intensionally (with a combination of inclusionary and
exclusionary definitions); unpatentable subject matter is simply
122 For a list of “[n]on-limiting examples” of such subject matter, see 2016 Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility [R-08.2017], U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., https://www.uspto.gov/web/
offices/pac/mpep/s2106.html [https://perma.cc/92WZ-MQ7G] (last visited Mar. 26, 2019)
(§ 2106.04(c)) (collecting cases).
123 Despite this substantive default in favor of unpatentability, as a procedural matter Federal
Circuit doctrine stages patent examination in such a way that “the examiner bears the initial
burden . . . of presenting a prima facie case of unpatentability.” In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443,
1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted). At least one commentator blames this procedural
device for issuance of patents that do not meet the standards of patentability. See Sean B.
Seymore, Patent Asymmetries, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 963, 976–91 (2016).
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everything in the universe of discourse that is not patentable subject
matter. 124
Because we must resort to complementation if we are to exhaust
the universe of discourse, revising the intensional predicates of the sets
corresponding to our legal categories is insufficient to comprehensively
resolve the potential for contradiction identified earlier. Instead, we
must revise the inclusion relations between the set of patentable subject
matter and its subsets. As with the law of sublease and assignment—and
as foreshadowed above—we achieve this through the operation of
subtraction. Formally, with respect to the relationship between the set of
“processes” and the set of “abstract ideas,” we achieve this as follows:
H⊆K
(A – H) ⊆ E

Thus, the graphic model of these sets can now be represented as
follows, eliminating the earlier contradiction:

124 Even if the default position were reversed—that is, even if the Supreme Court’s
exclusionary rule exhausted the category of unpatentable subject matter, leaving everything else
patentable—we would still need to rely on complementation and inclusion rather than
predication to arrive at an exhaustive model of the universe of discourse. Of course, if an
exhaustive model is not deemed necessary or desirable—if, for example, one is willing to
tolerate “gaps” in the law—predication might well be a sufficient basis for modeling the
interaction of mutually inconsistent rules such as those discussed in this Section. Indeed, it is
the legal positivist’s insistence on some authoritative source for legal rules in ascertainable
social facts that has the potential to generate such “gaps” in doctrinal models. See generally
Joseph Raz, Legal Reasons, Sources, and Gaps, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND
MORALITY 53 (2009).

Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete)

2019]

7/15/2019 4:26 PM

LEGAL SETS

2087

Figure 16

When we expand our focus to consider all the predicates
underlying our model of the doctrine of patentable subject matter, we
can use subtraction to revise our inclusion relations in a similar way to
resolve all the contradictions among our rules via the Trump Card
move. Expressing this series of moves formally, we have:
(F ⋃ G ⋃ H) ⊆ K
E = (A ⋃ B ⋃ C ⋃ D) – (F ⋃ G ⋃ H)
K = E'

This formalization of the Trump Card explains an important and
useful strategy for resolving conflicts between contradictory legal rules.
But as the discussion of this Part demonstrates, arriving at this
formalization required us to think hard about not only the rules
themselves, nor even their application to a particular set of facts, but
how they relate to one another, to various individual cases, and to the
full universe of discourse. Moreover, it required us to resolve an
ambiguity in our logic: We had to determine whether the relationships
among the different features of our model was best captured by a
modification of the predicates of certain sets (that is, the membership
relation between rules and cases), or by a modification of the
relationships between those sets (that is, the inclusion relation between
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rules and adjudicative outcomes). We will more thoroughly examine
this ambiguity in Part IV. First, let us review some alternative strategies
for avoiding the logical contradictions threatened by conflicting rules.
C.

The No True Scotsman

The No True Scotsman is an analytical move identified by
philosopher Antony Flew, who illustrated it by means of an anecdote:
Imagine some Scottish chauvinist settled down one Sunday morning
with his customary copy of The News of the World. He reads the story
under the headline, ‘Sidcup Sex Maniac Strikes Again’. Our reader is,
as he confidently expected, agreeably shocked: ‘No Scot would do
such a thing!’ Yet the very next Sunday he finds in that same
favourite source a report of the even more scandalous on-goings of
Mr Angus MacSporran in Aberdeen. This clearly constitutes a
counter example, which definitively falsifies the universal
proposition originally put forward. . . . Allowing that this is indeed
such a counter example, he ought to withdraw; retreating perhaps to
a rather weaker claim about most or some. But even an imaginary
Scot is, like the rest of us, human; and we none of us always do what
we ought to do. So in fact what he says is: ‘No true Scotsman would
do such a thing!’ 125

The No True Scotsman move allows us to maintain our predicates
and the sets constructed by them unchanged, at the cost of implausibly
denying their application to certain objects we rely on them to classify.
As Flew puts it, “[a] bold, indeed reckless, claim about all those who
happen to be members of a certain category is being surreptitiously
replaced by an utterance which is, in effect, made true by an arbitrary
redefinition.” 126
Many determinations in legal analysis have this kind of arbitrary
feel. Wherever a doctrine is subject to a flexible standard, a multi-factor
balancing test, or a totality-of-the-circumstances inquiry—as opposed to
a bright-line rule—reasonable minds will frequently differ as to whether
125 ANTONY FLEW, THINKING ABOUT THINKING 47 (1975) (emphasis added). Sidcup is a
suburban neighborhood of southeastern London.
126 Id. at 47–48.
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marginal cases fall within or without the category defined by the
applicable legal doctrine. Intellectual property law, for example, has no
shortage of such fuzzy doctrines: the “likelihood of confusion” multifactor tests for trademark infringement; 127 the “substantial similarity”
standard for copyright infringement; 128 the “fair, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory” standard for patent licensing terms; 129 the “nonobviousness” standard for patent validity. 130 Such standards are perhaps
even more common in less specialized areas of law: disagreements
abound as to what conduct is consistent with the duty of “reasonable
care,”131 what constitutes a “compelling state interest,” 132 or what is
consistent with “traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice.”133
We will return to the theoretical issues underlying the rules-versusstandards dichotomy and its relation to the set-theoretic model we are
developing later. 134 For now, we may confine ourselves to the
observation that such standards are especially vexing when they
threaten the type of doctrinal contradiction we have been examining in
this Part. To illustrate the problem, let us consider the interaction of the
127 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
§ 24:28–43 (4th ed. 1996); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir.
1961); AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348–49 (9th Cir. 1979).
128 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.03; Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946);
Sid & Marty Krofft TV Prods. v. McDonald’s Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977).
129 Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., 795 F.3d 1024, 1048 (9th Cir. 2015). In litigation
contexts, this standard intersects with yet another complex and fuzzy standard: the 15-factor
analysis for calculating patent damages under Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318
F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
130 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1966).
131 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS § 127 (2d ed.
2011) (“The duty owed by all people generally—the standard of care—is the duty to exercise the
care that would be exercised by a reasonable and prudent person under the same or similar
circumstances to avoid or minimize risks of harm to others.”).
132 See generally Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling State Interest Test and Strict
Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355 (2006).
133 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945); see also Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978) (“Like any standard that requires a determination of ‘reasonableness,’ the
‘minimum contacts’ test of International Shoe is not susceptible of mechanical
application . . . We recognize that this determination is one in which few answers will be
written in black and white. The greys are dominant and even among them the shades are
innumerable.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
134 See infra Section IV.B.
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copyright doctrines of fair use and the derivative works right. Section
106 of the Copyright Act gives copyright owners the exclusive right “to
prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work,” and to
authorize others to do so—unauthorized preparation of a derivative
work is an infringement of copyright. 135 However, this right is “subject
to” the doctrine of copyright fair use—codified in Section 107 of the
Act—which provides that a “fair use” of a copyrighted work “is not an
infringement of copyright.” 136 And “fair use” is a notoriously imprecise
doctrinal category. A finding of fair use depends on a weighing of four
statutory factors, each of which derives from—and has been further
developed by—a long line of case law. 137 Moreover, there appears to be
significant overlap between the categories “derivative work” and “fair
use.”
Section 101 of the Copyright Act defines a “derivative work” as “a
work based upon one or more pre-existing works, . . . [in any] form in
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 138 But under
current interpretations of Section 107, perhaps the single most
important factor in determining whether a use is “fair” (and therefore
non-infringing) is whether it is “transformative”: that is, whether it
“adds something new, with a further purpose or different character,
altering the first [work] with new expression, meaning, or message.” 139
Indeed, Jane Ginsburg recently concluded (or perhaps lamented) that
under current doctrine, “if the [defendant’s] use is ‘transformative,’ the
four-factor statutory test [for fair use under Section 107] effectively
reduces to a single factor.” 140 Thus, the “transformation” of a
17 U.S.C. §§ 106(2) (2002), 501(a) (2002).
17 U.S.C. §§ 106–07 (1976).
137 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976); 4 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 10 (2007).
138 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (emphasis added).
139 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578–79 (1994) (citing Pierre N. Leval,
Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1111 (1990)).
140 Jane C. Ginsburg, Fair Use for Free, or Permitted-but-Paid?, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1383,
1400 (2014); but see Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions,
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 595, 604–05 (2008) (“It appears . . . that courts and
commentators have exaggerated the influence of transformativeness doctrine on our fair use
case law. . . . Nevertheless, in those opinions in which transformativeness did play a role, it
exerted nearly dispositive force not simply on the outcome of factor one but on the overall
outcome of the fair use test. More specifically, the data suggest that while a finding of
transformativeness is not necessary to trigger an overall finding of fair use, it is sufficient to do
135
136
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copyrighted work without authorization may be both a necessary and a
sufficient basis to categorize a particular use of a copyrighted work as
both an infringing derivative work under Section 106 and a noninfringing fair use under Section 107. This contradiction has attracted
the attention of copyright scholars. 141
Note that this contradiction is structurally more difficult to resolve
via the Trump Card than was the patentable subject matter
contradiction. In the context of patentable subject matter, we had to
determine how to categorize an invention that was—for example—both
a “process” and an “abstract idea.” Here, we have to determine how to
categorize a use that is both a “transformation” for purposes of the
derivative works right and “transformative” for purposes of fair use
doctrine. In the latter context, it is not clear from the natural language
of the relevant predicates that the two doctrinal subsets of interest are in
fact different sets. If they are not, then we would be unable to avoid the
self-contradictory conclusion that a use of a copyrighted work that falls
into this set is simultaneously a derivative-works-right infringement and
a non-infringing fair use simply by subtracting one doctrinal set from
the other. (Subtraction would yield only the null set, implying that the
one doctrine completely abrogates the other.)
So let us assume for the moment that “uses that transform a
copyrighted work” and “uses that are transformative of a copyrighted
work” are in fact nonequivalent sets, and that all transformative uses are
fair while all uses that transform are infringing. We can begin to model
these sets along the lines of the model developed earlier in the context of
patentable-subject-matter doctrine (though for now the model will be
much simpler):

so.”). Professor Beebe’s regression analysis revealed that no factual finding had a stronger
association with a finding of fair use than a finding of transformativeness, and that only one
factual finding—that the defendant took the “heart” of the plaintiff’s copyrighted work—had a
stronger association in favor of either party.
141 See generally, e.g., R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right,
31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2008).
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E = {x: x is an infringement of copyright}
K = {x: x is not an infringement of copyright}
P(x) = x is a use that transforms a copyrighted work
A = {x: P(x)}
A⊆E
W(x) = x is a transformative use of a copyrighted work
H = {x: W(x)}
H⊆K

Again, it seems quite likely that sets A and H would have a large
area of intersection, but to serve our purposes in modeling the strategies
for resolving logical contradictions in doctrine we can represent our
model of copyright doctrines graphically as formally identical to our
model of patentable subject matter doctrine, to highlight the structural
similarities (and differences) between the two strategies we are
examining. We complete the model by positing some case n that is both
“a transformative use” and “a use that transforms,” and represent our
universe of discourse graphically (yielding a familiar picture):
Figure 17

The No True Scotsman is a strategy to resolve this contradiction by
positing that n is not in fact a “transformative use,” even though it
would seem to be under conventional understandings of the natural
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language of the predicate. The copyright example illustrates the strategy.
In much fair use litigation, the key question is whether the defendant’s
use is sufficiently “transformative” to qualify as a fair use, even though it
is undisputed that the defendant’s use has in some way changed the
plaintiff’s work in making a new use of it. Diane Zimmerman described
the underlying dilemma, and the moves by which courts resolve it:
What is hard to understand is why the courts engaged in so much
twisting and turning to avoid the seemingly obvious conclusion that,
whatever else might have been troubling in the defendants’ cases, the
uses in question were at least “transformative”: they clearly did
provide the public with a new or substantially reworked
product. . . . Judges who face a kind of transformative use that they
strongly believe ought to be controlled by the plaintiff alone may well
think that they are caught between the proverbial rock and a hard
place. It is little wonder, therefore, that they sometimes resolve their
dilemma by performing a little deft Lewis Carroll-type surgery on the
inconvenient word to create an escape for themselves from that
uncomfortable space. 142

We can identify this “twisting and turning” or “Lewis Carroll-type
surgery” as an instance of the No True Scotsman in action. For example,
in Castle Rock Entertainment, Inc. v. Carol Publishing Group, Inc. 143—
cited by Professor Zimmerman 144—the Second Circuit affirmed then–
District Judge Sotomayor’s award of summary judgment to the owners
of the copyright in the popular television show Seinfeld against the
publisher of an unauthorized book of trivia based on the show. The
court cited Section 101’s definition of “derivative work,” but explained:
“Although derivative works that are subject to the author’s copyright
transform an original work into a new mode of presentation, such
works—unlike works of fair use—take expression for purposes that are
142 Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The More Things Change the Less They Seem
“Transformed”: Some Reflections on Fair Use, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y. U.S. 251, 259–60 (1999)
(emphasis in the original). The reference to Lewis Carroll invokes his character of HumptyDumpty, who insisted: “When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean—neither
more nor less.” Id. at 252 n.5 (quoting LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS—AND
WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE 94 (1946)).
143 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998).
144 Zimmerman, supra note 142, at 251–52 & n.2.
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not ‘transformative.’” 145 More recently, in Cariou v. Prince, the Second
Circuit considered thirty works in which appropriation artist Richard
Prince reproduced and then modified copyrighted works by
photographer Patrick Cariou without permission. The court found
twenty-five of these thirty works to be fair uses as a matter of law, on
grounds that “Prince’s composition, presentation, scale, color palette,
and media are fundamentally different and new compared to the
photographs, as is the expressive nature of Prince’s work.” 146 But—citing
Castle Rock on the relationship between derivative works and fair
use 147—it remanded for further findings regarding the other five
works. 148 Its reasoning is an encapsulation of the No True Scotsman at
work: “[W]e cannot say for sure . . . whether Prince has transformed
Cariou’s work enough to render it transformative.” 149
The twisting and turning language in these cases does not seem to
be invoking the Trump Card—that is, these courts do not hold that if a
defendant’s use is transformative, it is perforce not a derivative work, or
that a defendant’s use that transforms the plaintiff’s work is perforce not
fair. 150 Instead, many courts appear to treat the category of derivative
works and the category of fair uses as if they have no determinate
relationship to one another—and in doing so are able to superficially
avoid the contradiction presented in our formal model. The No True
Scotsman allows them to do so by working at the level of the individual
Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 143.
Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–10 (2d Cir. 2013).
147 Id. at 708.
148 Id. at 710–11.
149 Id. at 711.
150 Indeed, one district court that held as much was criticized by Professor Reese as “clearly
incorrect.” Reese, supra note 141, at 469–70, quoting Clean Flicks of Colo., LLC v. Soderbergh,
433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1242 (D. Colo. 2006) (“[B]ecause the infringing copies of these movies are
not used in a transformative manner, they are not derivative works and do not violate
§ 106(2).”) (internal quotations omitted). The Seventh Circuit has similarly criticized Second
Circuit caselaw on grounds that it commits the same error. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766
F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1555 (2015) (“To say that a new use
transforms the work is precisely to say that it is derivative and thus, one might suppose,
protected under § 106(2). Cariou and its predecessors in the Second Circuit do no explain how
every ‘transformative use’ can be ‘fair use’ without extinguishing the author’s rights under
§ 106(2).”). As we will see, however, the Seventh Circuit is confusing the substance of the
Second Circuit’s approach to this particular doctrinal problem with the structure of that
approach. See infra Part IV.
145
146
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uses at issue in each case, finding that the defendant’s conduct falls
within one of the two conflicting categories and summarily asserting it
does not fall within the other. For example, the court in Micro Star v.
FormGen Inc. provided a lengthy analysis to support its conclusion that
the defendant had created an unauthorized derivative work by creating
additional levels for plaintiff’s copyrighted video game, and then
proceeded to dismiss the question of transformativeness in a single
sentence buried in a footnote. 151 Similarly, the court in Nihon Deizai
Himbun, Inc. v. Comline Business Data, Inc.—in which the defendant
had prepared English-language abstracts of plaintiff’s Japanese-language
articles—the court performed a thorough analysis of plaintiff’s
derivative-works-right claim, then in two sentences concluded that the
defendant’s uses were “not in the least transformative” because they
were “for the most part direct translations . . . [that] added almost
nothing new.” 152 In both cases, the courts’ assertion that the defendants’
uses of the plaintiffs’ works were not “transformative” seems
inconsistent with the ordinary meaning of the term. But as Castle Rock
suggests with its use of scare quotes, just because a derivative work
“transforms” the plaintiff’s expression, that does not make such a work
“transformative” as a legal matter. 153
Such a distinction between the ordinary meaning and the legal
meaning of a particular term as applied to a particular case is a hallmark
of the No True Scotsman. Rhetorically at least, such distinctions are
fairly common—indeed, they are often signaled with scare quotes—and
they help to resolve a case without disturbing a model of the universe of
discourse that depends on the disjointness of two sets at issue in the
case. The earlier history of the doctrine we investigated in the previous
section—the law of patentable subject matter—provides additional
examples of this dynamic. In Parker v. Flook, for instance, the Court
conceded that the applicant’s method “is a ‘process’ in the ordinary
sense of the word,” 154 but also noted that the Court’s earlier holding in
151 The entirety of the court’s analysis of the transformativeness of the defendant’s use was:
“[It] can hardly be described as transformative; anything but.” Micro Star v. FormGen Inc., 154
F.3d 1107, 1113 n.6 (9th Cir. 1998).
152 Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc. v. Comline Bus. Data, Inc., 166 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 1999)
(internal quotations omitted).
153 See supra text accompanying notes 143–45.
154 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 (1978).
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Gottschalk v. Benson 155 “forecloses a purely literal reading of § 101.”156
Indeed, in Benson the Court had telegraphed the availability of the No
True Scotsman move, framing the issue in that case as “whether the
method described and claimed is a ‘process’ within the meaning of the
Patent Act.” 157 (The fact that these opinions used language suggesting a
No True Scotsman in a universe of discourse that we ultimately
identified with the Trump Card presents interesting theoretical issues
that will be explored below.)
In both the older patentable subject matter cases and the more
recent fair use cases, courts are distinguishing between the ordinary
meaning of certain intensional definitions and the legal meaning of
those definitions in application to a particular state of the world. In other
words, they are asking whether this process is a true “process,” or this
transformation is truly “transformative.” In formal terms, the No True
Scotsman can be represented in our model of the universe of discourse
with a single move—evaluating the troublesome predicate in such a way
as to remove the contradictory membership relation:
¬ W(n)
∴n∉H
Graphically, the move can be depicted thus:

155
156
157

409 U.S. 63 (1972).
Flook, 437 U.S. at 588–89.
Benson, 409 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).
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Figure 18

The No True Scotsman is a strategy that releases the immediate
pressure of an apparent contradiction, but in doing so only increases the
strain on the logical structure that created the contradiction in the first
place. As cases that seem on their face to fall within the natural-language
intensional predicate of one doctrinal set are placed outside that set by
particular acts of ad hoc adjudication, the coherence of doctrinal sets
across time and circumstance becomes difficult to maintain—the link
between set predication and set membership begins to break down.
Because law is a human institution, such incoherence can endure for a
surprisingly long time without stimulating any radical reorganization of
set-theoretic models. Indeed, Flew predicted as much in identifying the
No True Scotsman as a feature of human psychology. Recall his original
example: The case of Agnus MacSporran should probably have led the
Scottish chauvinist to reevaluate the role of the category “Scotsmen” in
his model of the relevant universe of discourse. In particular, it ought to
have led him to reconsider whether members of this category all share
the distinctive characteristics he ascribes to them (i.e., whether the
category “Scotsmen” has a nonempty intersection with the category of
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“people who would do such a thing”). But Flew thinks such reevaluation
is unlikely—that we are resistant to revising our set-theoretic models of
the world around us if we can avoid it. As he puts it: “The temptation of
course is not just to slide, under the pressure of falsification, . . . [i]t is to
fail to recognize what has happened, and so to be apt to slide back again
into the original interpretation immediately that pressure is
removed.” 158
This psychological conjecture has some empirical support, 159 and it
is a particularly salient concern for legal analysis, reflected in the old
adage that hard cases make bad law. It is precisely when the
categorization of a set of facts as outside some seemingly applicable rule
(e.g., Agnus MacSporran is no true Scotsman) is inconsistent with
conventional understandings of the natural language in which that rule
is framed (e.g., Agnus MacSporran is a native Aberdonian; Aberdeen is
in Scotland) that we run the risk of inconsistency in our set-theoretic
models. This inconsistency, as Flew’s example suggests, may often arise
from results-oriented decision-making, and it can thus pose a direct
threat to the rule of law. 160 But the common law has a built-in check on
this kind of free-wheeling ad hoc decision-making: the recursive process
of extensional set-building that we earlier identified with the institution

158 FLEW, supra note 125, at 50. Similar tendencies have been flagged in philosophical
debates under the name of “humpty-dumptying” or “motte-and-bailey doctrines.” See generally
Nicholas Shackel, The Vacuity of Postmodernist Methodology, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 295 (2005).
159 See generally, e.g., Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning., 108 PSYCHOL. BULL.
480 (1990); Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection: An
Experimental Study, 8 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407 (2012); Ziva Kunda & Lisa Sinclair,
Motivated Reasoning with Stereotypes: Activation, Application, and Inhibition, 10 PSYCHOL.
INQUIRY 12 (1999).
160 The rule of law is obviously a complex and contested concept, but for present purposes it
simply refers to some standard of rationality and consistency in the application of legal rules.
For more on the concept, see generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in
Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997); cf. Dworkin, supra note 76, at 1064
(“Judges, like all political officials, are subject to the doctrine of political responsibility. This
doctrine states, in its most general form, that political officials must make only such political
decisions as they can justify within a political theory that also justifies the other decisions they
propose to make. The doctrine seems innocuous in this general form; but it does, even in this
form, condemn a style of political administration that might be called, following Rawls,
intuitionistic. It condemns the practice of making decisions that seem right in isolation, but
cannot be brought within some comprehensive theory of general principles and policies that is
consistent with other decisions also thought right.”).
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of precedent. 161 This process is key to the final contradiction-avoidance
strategy we must review.
D.

The Tertium Quid

The No True Scotsman ties the disposition of a case to the specific
facts of that case. In so doing, it purports to limit the effect of the
adjudication of the case on the model of the applicable doctrinal
universe of discourse—and particularly on the predicate for the set from
which the case is to be excluded. But because the outcome of a commonlaw adjudication has precedential value independent of the announced
rationale for that outcome, such efforts to limit a case to its facts are
inherently unstable. As Professor Schauer notes, it may be that law, as
an institution, inherently requires outcomes to be justified with reasons
that extend beyond the facts of a single case. 162 Thus, overt efforts by
courts to limit cases to their facts generally fail.
In intellectual property law we see an example of this dynamic in
the history of the doctrine of common-law misappropriation. A federal
common-law claim for misappropriation was recognized by the
Supreme Court in International News Service v. Associated Press, 163 in
which a wire service sued its competitor for copying its news stories
from East Coast newspapers and selling them to West Coast newspapers
at a discount. The Court held that the defendant could be held liable for
“appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown,” 164
dismissing any potential contradiction with the Copyright Act’s
exclusion of factual material from exclusive ownership with a wave of its
hand: “We need spend no time . . . upon the general question of
property in news matter at common law, or the application of the
copyright act, since it seems to us the case must turn upon the question
of unfair competition in business.” 165
Recognizing that this doctrinal contradiction could not be so
casually dismissed, Judge Learned Hand undertook in the case of
161
162
163
164
165

See supra Section II.C.
Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 653 & n.60 (1995).
248 U.S. 215 (1918).
Id. at 239–40.
Id. at 234–35.

Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete)

2100

7/15/2019 4:26 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2029

Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp. to limit INS v. AP to its facts. 166 Judge
Hand treated INS v. AP as an example of a No True Scotsman—“where
the occasion is at once the justification for, and the limit of, what is
decided.” 167 But his approbation notwithstanding, the misappropriation
cause of action continues to be asserted in the Second Circuit to this
day. In National Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, Inc., 168 the court listed the
elements of the cause of action in general terms—deriving them
primarily from the facts of INS. 169 And those elements have now become
the basis for a family of cases in which claims are asserted for
misappropriation of “hot news”—the category of information that was
found to have been misappropriated in INS. 170
This tendency of individual cases to become the seeds of
intensionally-defined doctrinal sets—even where courts go to great
lengths to prevent them from doing so—is an inevitable consequence of
the recursive nature of the common law. As discussed in Section II.C
above, doctrinally relevant sets may be constructed not only
intensionally, based on predicates found in the language of statutes or
judicial opinions, but extensionally, by collating and reconciling the
facts and results of individual cases that have precedential value. And in
areas of doctrine that tend to generate No True Scotsmen—areas where
existing intensional definitions conflict to the point where courts are
categorizing cases within or without those definitions on a seemingly ad
hoc basis—the recursive process of cataloguing and comparing the facts
and outcomes of these cases tends toward the development of some new
intensional definition emergent from the cases themselves. We saw an
example of this process in Kremen’s effort to reconcile two inconsistent
definitions of “property” for purposes of California conversion law.171
Such a newly developed intensional principle is necessarily distinct from
any pre-existing intensional definitions, which are therefore admitted to
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279, 280 (2d Cir. 1929).
Id.
168 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997).
169 See id. at 852.
170 See, e.g., Barclays Capital Inc. v. Theflyonthewall.com, Inc., 650 F.3d 876 (2d Cir. 2011).
Dow Jones & Co. v. Real-Time Analysis & News, Ltd., No. 14 CIV. 131 JMF GWG, 2014 WL
4629967 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2014) (default judgment), report and recommendation adopted,
2014 WL 5002092 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2014).
171 See supra notes 87–96 and accompanying text.
166
167
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provide an incomplete—or mistaken—model of the universe of
discourse. The identification of—and reliance on—such a distinct and
novel intensional principle is the last strategy for resolving doctrinal
conflict. I will refer to it as the Tertium Quid.
The Tertium Quid is an old work horse of the Langdellian case
method. It is one of the first tricks picked up by the first-year American
law student: to distill and generalize from the facts and outcomes of an
apparently inconsistent set of cases some new abstract principle—
distinct from the principles explicitly relied on in the opinions
themselves—to govern novel future cases. 172 In the context of our model
of doctrinal conflict, a hard-to-justify classification of a case as within or
without an existing intensionally-defined set may suggest the need for a
new set not accounted for in the existing model of the universe of
discourse. Moreover, this new set may turn out to be more relevant to
organizing the universe of discourse into the two universe-exhausting
complementary sets we assign to binary adjudicative outcomes. Thus, in
a common-law system, every No True Scotsman is the seed of a Tertium
Quid, and every Tertium Quid has the capacity to supplant previously
applicable doctrinal sets.
The areas of intellectual property law we have already examined
each provide some examples of efforts to deploy the Tertium Quid. In
patentable subject matter, for example, the “product of nature”
exclusion has been criticized as insufficient to explain the outcome of
cases such as Myriad. 173 As Dan Burk points out, the predicate “natural
phenomenon” does not provide any principled basis for the Myriad
Court’s distinction between a molecule of gDNA removed from its
position in a human chromosome and a corresponding, exon-only
cDNA molecule created in a lab. Neither molecule would have the same
physical qualities as the corresponding sequence of nucleotides found in
vivo within in a human cell. 174 Burk thus concludes that the “product of
172 See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff & Martha Minow, A Case for Another Case Method, 60 VAND. L.
REV. 597, 598–99 (2007) (“[S]tudents would be expected to work not only from the particular
to the general, but also from the general to the particular.”).
173 The Myriad Court itself alternately justified its holding under the “law of nature”
exception, Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 591 (2013), and
the “product of nature” exception, id. at 595.
174 Dan L. Burk, Edifying Thoughts of a Patent Watcher: The Nature of DNA, 60 UCLA L.
REV. DISC. 92, 98–101 (2013).
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nature” exclusion from patentable subject matter is generally unhelpful:
“At its endpoints, the doctrine either proves everything or proves
nothing. Either everything is a product of nature—drawn from and
existing in the world—or nothing is a product of nature—having been
intellectually and socially constructed by human cognition.” 175 He
argues that instead, courts should—and perhaps do—resolve patentable
subject matter cases by reference to an anti-preemption principle: that
“the basic tools of scientific and technological work” are not
patentable. 176 This anti-preemption criterion is a Tertium Quid: a new
predicate that supposedly offers a superior basis for the mapping of
cases to binary outcomes within the universe of discourse.
The indeterminacy generated by the contradiction between fair use
doctrine and the derivative works right in copyright has similarly
spawned efforts to deploy the Tertium Quid. Anthony Reese, for
example, cites various Court of Appeals opinions to argue that
“transformativeness” does not refer to transformation of a copyrighted
work, but rather to the use of such a work for a different purpose than
the purpose for which the copyright owner uses it. 177 Under this new
intensional definition of the relevant doctrinal set, “even making an
exact copy of a work may be transformative so long as the copy serves a
different function than the original work.” 178 Of course, the same
indeterminacy that makes the Tertium Quid attractive makes it
extremely useful in contesting any new model of the universe of
discourse. Professor Ginsburg, for example, has proposed dividing up
the universe of transformative uses even more finely—to exclude from
the fair use defense transformative purposes that are not authorial
purposes (i.e., where the transformative purpose is to drive a new
business model, such as online search). 179
To formalize the Tertium Quid, let us turn to an example from
another branch of intellectual property law: trademarks. Courts have
Id. at 101.
Id. at 102 (quoting Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). A similar line of
analysis suggests that the Supreme Court’s “abstract ideas” jurisprudence is being subsumed by
the search for an “inventive concept.” See, e.g., Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, PatentEligible Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349, 377–83 (2015).
177 Reese, supra note 141, at 485.
178 Id. (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1165 (9th Cir. 2007)).
179 See generally Ginsburg, supra note 140.
175
176
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long struggled with the application of trademark liability to defendants
who are using a plaintiff’s trademarks—at least in part—for expressive
purposes. Rochelle Dreyfuss summarized the dilemma in a 1989 article:
[Traditionally, trademark] claims focused on the impact of the mark
on purchasing decisions. By the same token, defenses centered on the
commercial requirements of the competitive marketplace. The terms
that delimited the reach of trademark law—consumer confusion, gap
bridging, fair use, genericity, abandonment—were understood
strictly by reference to these commercial interests. But as trademark
owners have begun to capitalize on the salience of these symbols in
the culture, the justifications that formerly delineated the scope of the
law have lost significance. . . . Lacking the traditional analytical tools
provided by trademark law, courts have lately attempted to apply
first amendment jurisprudence to such claims. . . . [A]lthough the
Constitution supplies a normative principle favoring public access to
the tools of expression, the body of law that has developed under the
first amendment provides a surprisingly uncongenial framework for
analysis. 180

The basic problem of doctrinal structure is a familiar one: In some cases,
the rule applying liability for trademark infringement contradicts the
rule insulating expression from legal liability. Specifically, liability for
infringement attaches when a defendant uses a plaintiff’s trademark in a
way that is “likely to cause confusion . . . as to the affiliation, connection,
or association of [defendant] with [plaintiff], or as to the origin,
sponsorship, or approval of [the defendant’s] goods, services, or
commercial activities by [plaintiff].” 181 But the First Amendment
generally forbids imposing legal liability based on the content of one’s
expression. 182 In cases where a defendant uses a trademark in an
expressive way, and thereby causes confusion, we have our familiar
contradiction.

180 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 398 (1989).
181 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2018).
182 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992).

Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete)

2104

7/15/2019 4:26 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2029

Once again, we can model this contradiction both formally and
graphically. Formally, our universe of discourse includes the following
definitions:
A = {x: x is a use of a trademark that is likely to cause consumer
confusion}
H = {x: x is a form of constitutionally protected expression}
A⊆E
H⊆K

Graphically, we can again represent our model of trademark
doctrines as structurally identical to our model of patentable subject
matter doctrine and copyright fair use doctrine. We again complete the
model by positing some case n in which the defendant has engaged in
conduct that is both “a use of a trademark that is likely to cause
consumer confusion” and “a form of constitutionally protected
expression,” and arrive at the now-familiar picture of our universe of
discourse:
Figure 19

While we might expect that a conflict between a constitutional
provision and a statutory cause of action would ordinarily be resolved
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via the Trump Card, 183 courts deciding trademark cases have not
consistently invoked that strategy when faced with First Amendment
defenses. Instead, for some time, they resorted to an implicit balancing
analysis—weighing the seriousness of the confusion caused by the
defendant’s activity against the importance of the speech interest
underlying that activity. The resolution of this balancing analysis often
invoked the No True Scotsman—a finding for the plaintiff or defendant
based on a contestable assertion regarding the case’s satisfaction of one
of the two applicable predicates. That is, in some cases the application of
trademark liability was found not to impose serious burdens on
expression; 184 in others the expression at issue was deemed unlikely to
cause any kind of confusion. 185
183 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 180 (1803) (“[A] law repugnant to the Constitution is
void.”).
184 San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539–40 (1987)
(“The possibility for confusion as to sponsorship is obvious . . . [and t]he application of the Act
to this commercial speech is not broader than necessary to protect the legitimate congressional
interest and therefore does not violate the First Amendment.”); Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co. v.
Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he protection afforded by the First Amendment
does not give Novak license to infringe the rights of Mutual. . . . Other avenues for Novak to
express his views exist and are unrestricted by the injunction.”); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v.
Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 776 (8th Cir. 1994) (“Balducci’s ad parody was likely to confuse
consumers as to its origin, sponsorship or approval. This confusion might have to be tolerated
if even plausibly necessary to achieve the desired commentary—a question we need not decide.
In this case, the confusion is wholly unnecessary to Balducci’s stated purpose.”); Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 205–06 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“The public’s belief that the mark’s owner sponsored or otherwise approved the use of the
trademark satisfies the confusion requirement. . . . Plaintiff’s trademark is in the nature of a
property right, and as such it need not yield to the exercise of First Amendment rights under
circumstances where adequate alternative avenues of communication exist.”) (internal citations
and quotation marks omitted); cf. MGM-Pathe Commc’ns Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774 F.
Supp. 869, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (“[T]he harm to the plaintiff resulting from the . . . likelihood of
public confusion . . . could seriously impair the value and continued usefulness of its mark. The
Patrol contends MGM’s suit is barred by the First Amendment. They contend that because the
Patrol is engaged in political speech, it is less subject to the trademark laws. There is no legal
support for this position. The seriousness and virtue of a cause do not confer any right to the
use of the trademark of another.”).
185 Lucasfilm Ltd. v. High Frontier, 622 F. Supp. 931, 934 (D.D.C. 1985) (“Defendants use
star wars in the body of their message in a descriptive manner to communicate ideas, rather
than to create confusion as to sponsorship.”); Girl Scouts of U.S. v. Personality Posters Mfg.
Co., 304 F. Supp. 1228, 1231 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (“Even if we hypothesize that some viewers might
at first blush believe that the subject of the poster is actually a pregnant Girl Scout, it is highly
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Eventually, however, this type of ad hoc adjudication—and its
reliance on the No True Scotsman—came to be replaced by the Tertium
Quid. In Rogers v. Grimaldi, the Second Circuit imposed a new structure
on the analysis applicable to the unauthorized use of trademarks in
certain expressive contexts:
We believe that in general the [Lanham] Act should be construed to
apply to artistic works only where the public interest in avoiding
consumer confusion outweighs the public interest in free expression.
In the context of allegedly misleading titles using a [protectable
trademark], that balance will normally not support application of the
Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work
whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the title
explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work. 186

The Rogers test explicitly acknowledged a category of cases in which the
two contradictory doctrinal sets may intersect—cases involving artistic
works whose titles include someone else’s trademark—and constructed
a new model of that doctrinal space. The most important implication of
this move is to suggest that the pre-existing model of the universe of
discourse—and in particular the intensionally defined sets that had been
thought to map to binary outcomes—are no longer helpful in
determining at least some relevant membership relations between cases
and outcomes. The identification of a new intensional definition of a
relevant set of cases, which intersects at least in part with the

doubtful that any such impression would be more than momentary or that any viewer would
conclude that the Girl Scouts had printed or distributed the poster.”); cf. L.L. Bean, Inc. v.
Drake Publishers, Inc., 811 F.2d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1987) (“The district court’s application of the
Maine anti-dilution statute to appellant’s noncommercial parody cannot withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Drake has not used Bean’s mark to identify or market goods or services;
it has used the mark solely to identify Bean as the object of its parody.”).
186 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989). The mark in question in Rogers was
the name of the famous dancer Ginger Rogers, which she claimed was being unfairly used in
the title of the Federico Fellini film “Ginger and Fred.” Rogers asserted that the title gave rise to
a false endorsement claim under the Lanham Act, in essence claiming her name served as a
protectable trademark—a claim that has been recognized by the federal courts in other
contexts. See 5 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 28:15 (5th ed. 2018) (“Courts hold that in the context of § 43(a)(1)(A), 15
U.S.C.A. § 1125(a)(1)(A), a human persona or identity is a kind of ‘trademark’ which is
infringed by a false endorsement.”) (citing cases).
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intersection of the pre-existing contradictory sets, is the defining feature
of the Tertium Quid. Graphically, we can model the move as follows:
Figure 20

The mere assertion of the existence of this new relevant set N does
not in itself provide any information about the relationship between N
and the binary outcomes in the universe of discourse. That is, the
Tertium Quid does not imply any particular relationship between the
new set N and the ultimate complementary sets E and K—only that
there exists some such relationship (for at least some subset of N), and
that this relationship takes precedence over the inclusion relationships
between A and E on the one hand and H and K on the other. 187

187

Formally, we can represent the logic of this move as follows:
∃(N)[N ∩ (A ∩ H) ≠ Ø]
n∈N

∃(Z)[(Z ⊆ N) ∧ ([Z ⊆ E] ⊕ [Z ⊆ K])]
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For an example of the ways such a newly identified set can be
mapped to binary outcomes, we can return to Rogers. Within the new
set Rogers had identified (i.e., titles of expressive works that contain
someone else’s trademark), the court defined two new subsets and
established their relations to the ultimate complementary sets defining
the binary outcomes of interest. Each of these two subsets—cases in
which the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work, and
cases in which the title explicitly misleads as to the source or content of
the work—were then included within the set corresponding to liability;
by implication expressive works that were not members of either subset
were immune from liability. “Ginger and Fred” was found not to fall
within either of the identified subsets, and therefore not to subject its
producers to liability. 188 Formally we may model the analysis as follows:
N = {x: x is an artistic work whose title contains someone else’s
trademark}
L = {x: x is an artistic work in which the inclusion of someone else’s
trademark in the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work}
M = {x: x is an artistic work in which the inclusion of someone else’s
trademark in the title explicitly misleads as to the source or content of
the work}
L⊆N
M⊆N
(L ⋃ M) ⊆ E
N – (L ⋃ M) ⊆ K
n∈N
n∉L
n∉M
∴n∈K

And we can also model the analysis graphically (representing only those
features of the universe of discourse that are of immediate interest):

Note an interesting implication of this formalization: as a matter of logical structure, the Trump
Card is equivalent to a special case of the Tertium Quid in which N = (A ∩ H) = Z.
188 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
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Figure 21

One interesting feature of the Tertium Quid is its durability in a
common law system relative to the No True Scotsman. Since it was
handed down, the framework of Rogers has been adopted by a growing
number of federal courts hearing cases in which a trademark claim runs
into a First Amendment defense. The Ninth Circuit adopted Rogers’
approach in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 189 and applied it to the
content (as opposed to merely the title) of expressive works in E.S.S.
Entertainment 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc. 190 (The Second Circuit
itself had extended Rogers to the content of expressive works almost
immediately. 191) Other Circuit Courts of Appeal have similarly adopted

189
190
191

1989).

296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
547 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2008).
Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ’g Grp., Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir.
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Rogers in one form or another. 192 As of this writing it is the most cited
American case dealing with the expressive use of trademarks. 193
As noted above, 194 the recursive nature of common-law
adjudication means that the use of a No True Scotsman in an existing
area of doctrine always has the potential to establish and propagate a
new intensional definition. The Tertium Quid, however, provides such a
definition, and in so doing has the potential to bring considerable
stability to an area of doctrine where consistency is lacking. That is, a
precedent that announces a Tertium Quid as the rationale for its
decision purports to instruct future courts that in the case of this
particular doctrinal contradiction, they ought to resolve the
contradiction in a particular way. The Trump Card similarly can
stabilize inconsistent doctrine when announced as the rationale for a
decision: It instructs future courts to apply one conflicting rule and
ignore the other. 195 The No True Scotsman lacks this quality, and does
so because of its logical form: It speaks to the membership relations
between a case and a legal set, but says nothing about the relationships
between the legal sets whose inconsistency required its invocation. In
the next Part, we will attempt to connect this relationship between the
form of the various contradiction-avoidance strategies and the evolution
of the universes of discourse in which they arise to deeper theoretical
issues in the analysis of common-law legal systems.

192 See, e.g., Radiance Found., Inc. v. N.A.A.C.P., 786 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2015); Univ. of
Alabama Bd. of Trustees v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278 (11th Cir. 2012); Parks v.
LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437, 451 (6th Cir. 2003); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 971–72 (10th Cir. 1996); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,
Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 665 (5th Cir. 2000); cf. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 157 (3d Cir.
2013) (“While the [Rogers] Test may have a use in trademark-like right of publicity cases, it is
inapposite here.”).
193 Westlaw Key Number Search 382Tk1524 (Trademarks>Violations of Rights>Defenses,
Excuses, and Justifications>Justified or Permissible Uses>Expressive Use; Commentary) (last
visited Mar. 25, 2019); see also Westlaw Key Number Search 92k1604 (Constitutional
Law>Freedom of Speech, Expression, and Press>Trade or Business>Trademarks and Trade
Names) (last visited Mar. 25, 2019) (second most cited case, after Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1
(1979), a commercial speech/occupational licensing case).
194 See supra notes 172–74 and accompanying text.
195 Again, this makes sense insofar as we have established that the Trump Card is formally a
special case of the Tertium Quid. See supra note 187.
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Summary

We are now in a position to provide a graphical summary and
decision tree for the various formal contradiction-resolution strategies
reviewed in this Part. Both are provided in Figures 22 and 23 below.
This summary presents an array of formal options by which an advocate
may argue—or a judge may decide—an issue in an area of law where
rules conflict. The next Part will discuss some implications of the model
heretofore developed, as well as some of its limitations and its
interactions with other aspects of legal theory.
Figure 22

Contradiction

No True Scotsman

Trump Card

Tertium Quid

Sheff.40.5.9 (Do Not Delete)

7/15/2019 4:26 PM

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

2112

[Vol. 40:2029

Figure 23
P(n) ∧ W(n);

n ∈ A ∧ n ∈ H;
A∩H=Ø
(⊥)

¬W(n);

W(n)
(⊥)

n∉H
No True
Scotsman
(A – H) ⊆ E;
H ⊆ K;
Trump Card

∃(N)[N ∩ (A ∩ H) ≠ Ø];
n ∈ N;
∃(Z)[(Z ⊆ N) ∧ ([Z ⊆ E] ⊕ [Z ⊆ K])]
Tertium Quid

IV. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS
With a thorough understanding of how various moves in legal
practice can be modeled using set theory, we can begin to explore some
of the implications of these models, and the ways in which a settheoretic model of legal practice interfaces with other aspects of legal
theory. In this Part, I will sketch out ways in which the set-theoretic
model developed above can provide a framework within which more
established approaches to legal theory can do their work. The model
does so principally by cutting through ambiguities of language that
bedevil both the practice of law and the arguments of legal theorists. In
doing so, it provides reasons to believe that certain topics of
jurisprudential interest and debate can be helpfully understood as
emergent—and perhaps inevitable—properties of the set-theoretic
structure of a common-law system.
A.

What the Set-Theoretic Model Is, and What It Is Not

I have been referring to the set-theoretic model of legal practice as
a formal model to distinguish it from substantive models of law or legal
practice—the typical concerns of legal theory. Legal theorists generally
deal with what we might call the substance of legal systems—ontological
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concepts such as Hart’s “rule of recognition” 196 or Dworkin’s “grounds
of law” 197; prescriptive agendas that motivate debates between textualists
and purposivists, or originalists and dynamists; 198 psychological theories
of what judges “actually” do, such as those that divide realists and antirealists; 199 and so on. The set-theoretic model developed in this Article
can accommodate any of these substantive theories, because its goals are
relatively modest in comparison to such sweeping ideological projects. It
aims only to provide a formal language to describe the behaviors that
put any such substance into practice. As I hope will become apparent,
this modest ambition is still a worthy one, and illuminates important
aspects of legal practice and even of legal theory, but it necessarily omits
certain features that some theorists might deem important to a model of
a legal system.
First, the set-theoretic model lacks any theory of empirical
validation. It cannot tell us when a particular fact in the world is true or
false. Thus, when evaluation of a case’s membership in a legal set
requires some knowledge about the state of the world, we require some
means from outside the model for obtaining and evaluating that
knowledge. These external means may also be channeled through law,
and that body of law may itself be modeled using sets—as with the law
of evidence, rules allocating fact-finding responsibility, burdens of proof
and persuasion, and procedural law generally. 200 But a set-theoretic
model of substantive law takes the outputs of these aspects of the legal
system as inputs into other universes of discourse; they are
complementary parts of a larger whole. The key point is that the settheoretic model itself does not purport to provide any mechanism for
determining such empirical facts—though it may be able to model
systems (particularly legal systems) that do.
HART, supra note 8, at 94–110.
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 4–6 (1986).
198 Even the recent empirical turn in the debate is substantive, to the extent it seeks to
discern what motivates judicial acts of interpretation. See generally William Baude, Is
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349 (2015).
199 See generally Leiter, supra note 12.
200 An especially persuasive account of how legal systems arrive at such determinations can
be found in the “fuzzy logic” model developed by Kevin Clermont. Kevin M. Clermont,
Conjunction of Evidence and Multivalent Logic, in LAW AND THE NEW LOGICS (H. Patrick
Glenn & Lionel D. Smith eds., 2017).
196
197
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Second, the set-theoretic model lacks what Schauer calls a “rule of
relevance”: an “organizing standard specifying which similarities
[between cases] are important and which we can safely ignore.” 201 Such
rules are a focus of other efforts to model the logic of law and other
deontic systems, 202 and their omission is felt in two aspects of my model.
First, knowing how to model the formulation and conflict of legal rules,
or even the resolution of that conflict, does not necessarily help us
identify whether a particular rule is implicated in a particular case. It
does not, for example, provide any route to generate the statement “this
series of events may give rise to a negligence claim,” or “this statute may
pose a free exercise problem,” or “this litigant may have a justification
defense.” Second, understanding that legal sets may be constructed
extensionally from collections of cases does not tell us (beyond
identification of a prevailing party) how to identify which cases belong
together and which ones do not, let alone how best to formulate an
intensional predicate for a set constructed in this way. For either of
these important tasks, we need some theory of relevance from outside
the model. In short, the model cannot tell us which set predicates to
evaluate against a particular case or group of cases; it can only provide a
framework for that evaluation once the relevant predicates have been
identified (or constructed). 203 For the present, I am content to
hypothesize that such rules of relevance are, like the conflict-resolution
strategies described above, best understood as emerging from legal
practice rather than supposedly abstract legal substance.

Schauer, supra note 98, at 577–78.
See, e.g., NAVARRO & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 166–75 (citing CARLOS ALCHOURRÓN
& EUGENIO BULYGIN, NORMATIVE SYSTEMS 103, 107 (1971)).
203 These missing theories of relevance are likely the province of professional training, and
more generally of social context. See Schauer, supra note 98, at 578 (rules of relevance “are
contingent upon both time and culture”); Pierre J. Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 379, 407 (1985) (“After all, the question whether a piece of text (such as a rule or a
standard) applies to a given context is a function of context.”); Jack M. Balkin, The Framework
Model and Constitutional Interpretation, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 241, 248 (David Dyzenhaus & Malcom Thorburn eds., 2016) (“[A]t any
point in time, some proposed interpretations are ‘off-the-wall,’ while others are plausible or
‘on-the-wall,’ even if they are not necessarily the best interpretation. . . . [T]he boundary
between what people regard as reasonable and unreasonable is not fixed; it can change as a
result of legal discussion and political mobilization.”).
201
202
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Third, and finally, the model does not itself provide any guidance
on which of the three contradiction-avoidance strategies a legal actor
ought to use in any particular situation. We could imagine that such
guidance might be part of a legal system, as a matter of positive law. We
have already noted examples of such guidance in our own legal system:
the Model Penal Code’s treatment of lesser included offenses seems to
require the Trump Card; 204 Kremen’s preference for extensional setbuilding implies that inconsistent cases should be resolved via the
Tertium Quid. 205 We can call these types of purported constraints on the
set-theoretic moves available to legal actors reconciliation rules. A
reconciliation rule, in this view, is any aspect of a legal system that
purports to compel an actor within that system to choose one
contradiction-avoidance strategy rather than another. As I will argue
below, one of the most important implications of a set-theoretic model
is that it casts serious doubt on the possibility that such reconciliation
rules can in themselves be effective in constraining the behavior of legal
actors.
Even with these limitations, the types of analyses reviewed in this
Article can be extremely helpful in organizing one’s thinking about how
lawyers and judges do what they do (as I hope the previous Parts of this
Article have demonstrated). Moreover, they can be helpful in clearing
up ambiguities in theoretical discussions about law. That is not because
the set-theoretic model is itself a model of what law “is” in some
metaphysical sense, or that it is a prescriptive model of what judges or
lawyers ought to do, or even that it describes what they believe they do
or ought to do. Rather, it is because the set-theoretic model provides a
language and a set of tools that allows the thinkers who investigate such
problems to avoid talking past one another, and exposes some features
of law as a social practice that emerge from the structure of the legal
system itself. The remainder of this Part will sketch a few examples.

204
205

See supra Section II.B.2.
See supra Section II.C.
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Precision and Generality: Rules and Standards, Policies and
Principles

The rules-versus-standards dichotomy is one of the most familiar
in legal theory. It has ossified into a routine set of pro-and-con
arguments regarding the merits of bright-line rules and flexible
standards: a “dialectic” that Pierre Schlag despairingly (or cynically)
characterized as “irreducible.” 206 Duncan Kennedy famously attempted
to tie the distinction to ideological and political strands in adjudication:
mapping “form” (the rule/standard design choice) to “substance” (the
political and ideological implications of the design choice). 207 The late
Justice Scalia identified rules with the constraint of judicial discretion,
and with his favored interpretive theory of originalism. 208 Louis Kaplow
built an economic model around the dichotomy, tying it to gradients in
information costs and administration costs. 209 In these scholarly
treatments, the difference between rules and standards is treated as if it
is usefully reducible to a single dimension or spectrum. But the logical
characteristics that distinguish what we call rules from what we call
standards are more complex than a one-dimensional gradient. And the
failure to properly distinguish the multiple formal distinctions among
what legal theorists refer to as “rules” or “standards” results in the
jumbling together of distinct theoretical issues. The set-theoretic model
can help cut through this ambiguity.
One sense in which we might distinguish a rule from a standard
involves evaluation of membership relations. In particular, it involves
the extent to which a set’s boundary is clearly delineated by an
intensional predicate. By formulating legal directives as sets, and
diagramming them with Venn Diagrams, I do not mean to suggest that
such directives always draw sharp boundaries between close cases.
Whether the intensional predicate of a doctrinally relevant set clearly

Schlag, supra note 203, at 426.
See generally Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89
HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976).
208 See generally Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175
(1989).
209 See generally Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557 (1992).
206
207
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identifies what is in and what is out of that set depends on the words in
which that predicate is framed and the state of the world (or our
knowledge of the state of the world) against which it is evaluated. And
when predicates are specified in natural language—as in a legal system
they generally are—there will often be uncertainty over whether they are
a truthful description of a particular state of the world, just because the
correspondence of words to facts in the world is not perfect. 210
We can understand this aspect of the rules/standards dichotomy to
refer to the precision of legal directives. 211 Precision, as used here, refers
to the degree of correspondence between natural language and the
world: A more precise predicate reduces uncertainty in evaluating the
membership relations between that predicate and facts in the world. For
example, the directive “The terms of the President and Vice President
shall end at noon on the 20th day of January” 212 more precisely
identifies constraints on the office of President than the directive “he
shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed” 213; the classic precise
predicate is the prohibition that “no person shall drive a vehicle at a
speed in excess of fifty-five miles per hour.” 214
But there is another very different sense in which we might
distinguish a rule from a standard. In the previous Part we focused on
the possibility that two distinct legal directives might conflict, but of
course it is also possible that they could coincide. That is: Two different
legal directives might both require the same result in a particular case,
but for different reasons. Often when there are two legal directives that
coincide in this way, it is because one of the directives is framed in such
a way as to address only a subset of the cases governed by the other
directive. For example, the Equal Protection Clause—“nor shall any
State . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection

See generally Schauer, supra note 98.
This is the sense in which Timothy Endicott evaluates the “precision” (or its converse,
“vagueness”) of legal texts, and it may be decomposed further into imprecision along various
semantic dimensions, none of which are important to the distinction I am attempting to draw.
See generally Timothy Endicott, The Value of Vagueness, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 14 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011).
212 U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
213 U.S. CONST. art. II § 3.
214 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1180(b) (2016).
210
211
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of the laws” 215—has purchase on legal disputes involving nearly every
area of human interaction. 216 Conversely, the command of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965—that “[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to
voting, or standard, practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied
by any State or political subdivision to deny or abridge the right of any
citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or color” 217—deals
only with the narrower domain of state electoral rules. For legal disputes
within that narrower domain, the Voting Rights Act might well generate
the same outcomes as the Equal Protection Clause, even though the
statute says nothing about other areas—such as education, or housing,
or government benefits—that might come within the command of the
constitutional provision.
We can give this difference in scope a name: call it generality.
Generality is a measure of the proportion of the conceptual space within
a relevant universe of discourse to which a particular predicate may be
relevant. In a nutshell, within our set-theoretic model, generality is a
measure of the size of a legal set; precision is a measure of the sharpness
of its boundary. 218 Both precision and generality are relevant to the
characterization of a legal directive as either a rule or a standard, but
legal theorists often blur the two dimensions together. 219 The result is
that they conflate two very different points: one about the nature of legal

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1972).
217 Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437 (1965).
218 Cf. Adam M. Samaha, Levels of Generality, Constitutional Comedy, and Legal Design,
2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1733, 1744, 1749 (2013) (“[A]bstractness includes vagueness and other
hindrances to ease of understanding. . . . Breadth . . . [involves the dimension along which a]
source might be understood to bear on a broad range of circumstances or only a narrow corner
of social life.”) (emphasis omitted).
219 One notable exception is Cass Sunstein’s theory of judicial minimalism, which—though
it does not directly engage the rules/standards dichotomy—reflects in its concepts of “depth”
and “width” features analogous (though not identical) to the ideas of “precision” and
“generality” that I describe here. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 10–19 (1999). For example, Sunstein’s concept of
“depth” has to do with the depth of theoretical principle underlying a particular disposition;
generality does not speak to substantive theory, but rather to the concepts of inclusion—the
idea that a particular case is representative of a broader set of cases, and that those cases can be
tied together by a sufficiently encompassing intensional definition. See id.
215
216
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directives framed in natural language, and the other about the behavior
of legal actors engaging with one another over time.
Take this representative passage from Kathleen Sullivan’s
Foreword to the 1992 Supreme Court Issue of the Harvard Law Review:
A legal directive is “rule”-like when it binds a decisionmaker to
respond in a determinate way to the presence of delimited triggering
facts. Rules aim to confine the decisionmaker to facts, leaving
irreducibly arbitrary and subjective value choices to be worked out
elsewhere. . . . A legal directive is “standard”-like when it tends to
collapse decisionmaking back into the direct application of the
background principle or policy to a fact situation. Standards allow for
the decrease of errors of under- and over-inclusiveness by giving the
decisionmaker more discretion than do rules. Standards allow the
decisionmaker to take into account all relevant factors or the totality
of the circumstances. Thus, the application of a standard in one case
ties the decisionmaker’s hand in the next case less than does a rule. 220

Dean Sullivan’s initial definition of a rule invokes the dimension of
precision—favoring “delimited” predicates and avoiding “arbitrary and
subjective” ones. But her definition of a standard invokes the dimension
of generality: a “background principle or policy” rather than the
narrower, more focused directives that might be included within, or
consistent with, such a policy. Moreover, her discussion of rule-like
directives is about the characteristics of rules as tools for constraining
legal actors. Rules (or standards) are the subject, legal actors the object.
But the last sentence slides into the passive voice, masking a reversal of
roles. When she discusses “the application . . . in one case” of a rule or a
standard, the subject is the legal actor who does the applying; the rule
(or standard) has become the object. That is, she has shifted into
discussion of the selection of tools by legal actors. These two pairs of
conflated concepts—precision with generality, and characteristics of
rules with characteristics of behavior—bear unpacking.

220 Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules
and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 58–59 (1992) (emphasis added).
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The problem with blurring together the concept of precision with
the concept of generality is that the two are not strictly correlated. 221 To
be sure, the more general a legal directive is, the less precise it is likely to
be, if only because a directive that purports to apply to a broad and
diverse range of states of the world will necessarily be framed in words
that have purchase on multiple diverse aspects of the world. 222 But one
can imagine highly general directives that are quite precise—for
example: “always decide a legal dispute in favor of the party with the
higher adjusted gross income on their previous year’s income tax
return.” And of course, an imprecise directive might be quite specific—
for example: “No person shall open the door of a motor vehicle on the
side available to moving traffic unless and until it is reasonably safe to
do so.” 223 Perhaps the most familiar example of the mutual
independence of precision and generality can be seen in legislative
delegations of regulatory authority. For example, Section 619 of the
Dodd-Frank Act (the so-called “Volcker Rule”) prohibits banks from
“acquiring or taking positions in [certain financial instruments]
principally for the purpose of selling in the near term”; 224 federal
agencies then promulgated a presumption that a position held for less
than sixty days constituted a violation of the rule. 225 The generality of
both directives is the same—they are directed to the same category of
human conduct—but the precision of the directives is different—a
presumption based on the passing of a fixed period of time as compared
with a description of the “purpose” of the directive’s target.
The distinction between the precision and generality of legal
directives has important implications for the second set of concepts
conflated in Dean Sullivan’s discussion: the characteristics of legal

221 See Samaha, supra note 218, at 1749–50 (diagramming the interaction between the
author’s posited dimensions of “abstractness” and “breadth,” which have affinities with
precision and generality as defined herein).
222 Cf. Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights,
57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1057, 1058 (1990) (“[A]t what level of generality should the Court describe
the right previously protected and the right currently claimed? The more abstractly one states
the already-protected right, the more likely it becomes that the claimed right will fall within its
protection.”) (emphasis omitted).
223 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1214 (1964).
224 12 U.S.C. §§ 1851(a)(1)(A), (h)(4), (h)(6) (2018).
225 17 C.F.R. § 255.3(b)(2) (2014).
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directives and the practices of legal actors. This is because of the
possibility of multiple directives at different levels of generality bearing
on any given case, and the need for legal actors to choose from among
them. These choices imply a dimension of legal discretion that goes
beyond the imprecision of natural language—and the concomitant
indeterminacy of the application of any particular rule to a case—to the
underlying structure of a common-law system. Put simply, legal actors
not only decide whether their case falls within the language of a legal
directive, but also which of multiple directives at different levels of
generality they will use to evaluate the case. Moreover, these two
dimensions of discretion are independent of one another, and the latter
dimension depends not (or not only) on the language in which a
directive is framed, but—as the rest of this Part will explain—on the
interactions among legal actors over time.
The set-theoretic model is obviously not necessary for an
appreciation of these distinctions lying under the surface of the
rules/standards dichotomy. But, I contend, it is extremely useful in this
regard, precisely because such distinctions emerge effortlessly from its
foundational distinction between membership and inclusion, mapping
to the relationship between cases and legal directives on the one hand,
and among multiple legal directives on the other. The model thus not
only brings clarity and precision to the debate over the rules/standards
dichotomy, it also foregrounds (helpfully, in my view) the role of legal
actors and their behaviors in the dilemmas that dichotomy supposedly
presents.
C.

Dimensions of Discretion: Precedent

Another example from intellectual property law demonstrates the
utility of the set-theoretic model in understanding how theoretical
concerns about law emerge from the structure of interactions among
legal actors over time. In this case, the theoretical concern is the nature
of precedent, and particularly its ability to constrain legal actors. The
doctrine of aesthetic functionality in trademark law, as explained in the
Supreme Court case of Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co. 226 and its
226

514 U.S. 159 (1995).
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progeny, prohibits any firm from attempting to protect any product
feature as a trademark “if exclusive use of the feature would put
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage”227 by
allowing monopolization of features that are “intended not to identify
the source [of the product], but to render the product itself more useful
or more appealing.” 228 However, trademark law does allow producers to
claim exclusive rights to “trade dress” product features 229 provided that
they have established “secondary meaning” for such features—that is, if
a substantial portion of the consuming public has come to associate the
product feature with one particular producer. 230 A doctrinal conflict
therefore arises with respect to product features that consumers demand
for both reputation-related and non-reputation-related reasons. In
recent litigation over Christian Louboutin’s red-soled stiletto shoes, the
record presented exactly such a conflict. Louboutin himself had
admitted that the red soles of his shoes were desirable because they were
“engaging, flirtatious, memorable and . . . sexy,” but the record also
established that “in the high-stakes commercial markets and social
circles in which these things matter a great deal, the red outsole became
closely associated with Louboutin.” 231
In deciding Louboutin’s motion for a preliminary injunction
against Yves Saint Laurent (which was marketing shoes that were red all
over, including their soles), District Judge Marrero invoked the Tertium

227 Id. at 165; see also Traffix Devices v. Mktg. Displays, 532 U.S. 23, 33 (2001) (“It is proper
to inquire into a ‘significant non-reputation-related disadvantage’ in cases of aesthetic
functionality.”).
228 Wal-Mart Stores v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205, 213 (2000).
229 Trade dress “involves the total image of a product and may include features such as size,
shape, color or color combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.” Two
Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 764 n.1 (1992) (quoting John H. Harland Co. v.
Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (11th Cir. 1983)). Trade dress may include not only
aspects of a product’s packaging but of its design as well.
230 Wal-Mart Stores, 529 U.S. at 211 (quoting Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.
844, 851 & n.11 (1982)) (“[A] mark has acquired distinctiveness, even if it is not inherently
distinctive, if it has developed secondary meaning, which occurs when, ‘in the minds of the
public, the primary significance of a [mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than
the product itself.’”) (modification in original).
231 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2d 445, 447–48
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
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Quid by situating the case as a member of a newly identified set of cases
involving the use of particular colors in fashion goods:
[T]he Court must decide whether there is something unique about
the fashion world that militates against extending trademark
protection to a single color, although such registrations have
sometimes been upheld in other industries. . . . [T]he Court cannot
conceive that the Lanham Act could serve as the source of the broad
spectrum of absurdities that would follow recognition of a trademark
for the use of a single color for fashion items. 232

On appeal, the Second Circuit did not disturb Judge Marrero’s
disposition of the preliminary injunction motion, but it emphatically
rejected his inclusion-based Tertium Quid move, instead opining that
he should have simply evaluated the membership relation between the
case and a legal directive extracted from the text of the Qualitex opinion:
Qualitex requires an individualized, fact-based inquiry into the
nature of the trademark, and cannot be read to sanction an industrybased per se rule. The District Court created just such a rule. . . . Even
if Qualitex could be read to permit an industry-specific per se rule of
functionality (a reading we think doubtful), such a rule would be
neither necessary nor appropriate here. 233

However, rather than undertaking such an inquiry, the Second Circuit
disposed of the case by evaluating a different membership relation. That
is, rather than finding that the claimed mark was not functional under
the test of Qualitex—as it said the District Court should have done—the
Second Circuit concluded the trademark as claimed was not sourceidentifying. 234 This avoided the contradiction not only by using a
Id. at 451, 457.
Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 223 (2d
Cir. 2012).
234 The Second Circuit opinion also determined—in what can only be categorized as an
advisory opinion given its other holdings—that Louboutin’s claimed trademark was only
partially (as opposed to completely) invalid. See id. at 227–28 (“[T]he record fails to
demonstrate that the secondary meaning of the Red Sole Mark extends to uses in which the sole
does not contrast with the upper—in other words, when a red sole is used on a monochromatic
red shoe. . . . We therefore instruct the Director of the Patent and Trade Office to limit the
registration of the Red Sole Mark to only those situations in which the red lacquered outsole
contrasts in color with the adjoining ‘upper’ of the shoe. . . . [W]e hold that the Red Sole Mark is
232
233
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different logical strategy, but by resort to different rules within the
universe of discourse.
The difference between the District Court and Court of Appeals
opinions in Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent has little to do with the
uncertain application of legal rules to the specific dispute before the
courts. The precision of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality simply
played no role. In both opinions, Louboutin’s claimed trademark was
found unenforceable against Yves Saint Laurent—in the District Court
because it was functional, in the Second Circuit because it was not
source-identifying. Neither rationale is substantively inconsistent with
the other. The primary reason to reverse the District Court’s resolution
of the doctrinal conflict it faced was formal, and hinged on the recursive
structure of a common-law system. That is, the Second Circuit’s reversal
changed the prospective effect of the disposition of the dispute on the
structure of the universe of discourse in which the conflict arose. The
District Court would have reshaped that structure to prevent the
contradiction it encountered from arising in the future as a matter of
logical form. The Court of Appeals preferred to leave the existing
structure—and its potential for contradiction—intact, rather than alter
the model with a novel intensional definition of a heretofore
unrecognized set (i.e., “color as a trademark for fashion items”).
The Louboutin case demonstrates how courts can and do shape
their behaviors with a view not only to the substance of their decisions,
but to their effect on the formal structure of the universe of discourse
within which those decisions are situated. It is a reminder of the
theoretical insight that precedent is not only “backward-looking”—
insofar as it purports to base a present adjudication on adjudications of
the past—but also “forward-looking”—insofar as the reasons for today’s
decision purport to bind future legal actors. 235 The legal directives
announced in judicial opinions—like any legal authorities—may be
framed in language that is more or less precise. But they may also be
pitched at different levels of generality. Thus, on their face, at least,

valid and enforceable as modified. . . . Having limited the Red Sole Mark as described above,
and having established that the red sole used by YSL is not a use of the Red Sole Mark, it is
axiomatic that we need not—and should not—address . . . whether the modified Mark is
functional.”) (emphasis added).
235 DWORKIN, supra note 197, at 225; see generally Schauer, supra note 98.
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inclusion moves—like the Tertium Quid and the Trump Card—make
more substantial claims on the behavior of future legal actors than
membership moves—like the No True Scotsman. For example, as a
forward-looking precedent, the opinion: “we cannot find substantial
equality in the educational opportunities offered white and Negro law
students by the State [of Texas]” 236 makes fewer claims on future legal
disputes than the opinion: “[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.” 237
Legal actors with sophisticated understandings of the types of
logical moves available to them can deploy those moves strategically, in
a bid to shape the universe of discourse in a preferred direction over
time. 238 The normative desirability of such strategic behavior is beyond
the scope of this article. But from a purely descriptive standpoint, we are
confronted with two questions central to the nature of precedent: First,
whether we think such strategic efforts are likely to be successful in
influencing the behavior of future legal actors. And second, whether law
can constrain such strategic efforts. The set-theoretic model does not
provide complete answers to these questions, but it suggests that both
answers are interconnected. Specifically, the indeterminacy baked into
the structure of law as a social practice limits the power of any particular
legal actor to leverage that indeterminacy in results-oriented ways.
D.

Meta-Rules: Sets All the Way Down

How might a legal actor constrain, in advance, a different legal
actor’s later evaluation of a case? Such a project is beset with practical
problems, which Hart famously identified with epistemic deficiencies of
the would-be constrainer: “ignorance of fact” and “indeterminacy of
aim.” 239 But it also raises theoretical problems arising from the structure
of law as a social practice, corresponding to the dimension of precision,
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950).
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
238 See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of
Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2001) (arguing that precedent
can create a kind of “path dependence” that constrains future doctrinal development).
239 See HART, supra note 8, at 127–28; see also H. L. A. Hart, Discretion, 127 HARV. L. REV.
652, 661–63 (2013).
236
237
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the dimension of generality, and the set-theoretic interaction of
directives that vary along both dimensions as precedents making claims
on the behavior of legal actors over time.
The ineliminable discretion that results from the imprecision of the
language in which legal directives are wrought is a well-worn theoretical
chestnut. For example, Hart’s famous example of a legal rule forbidding
vehicles in the park 240 is generally used as the jumping-off point for
debates over the relation of a number of hypothetical states of the world
to the word “vehicle”—that is, about the proper way to ascertain the
relationship between a legal text and a state of the world. 241 The
theoretical architecture of interpretation—of which Hart’s exercise is a
classic exemplar—is largely concerned with the application of rules to
states of the world and with minimizing or resolving the uncertainty of
such an exercise. So, for example, when originalists argue (either
amongst themselves or with adversaries such as living constitutionalists)
over the proper interpretation of legal texts, 242 they are generally talking
about interpretation of the meaning of the words of those texts—in light
of whatever sources of meaning they deem acceptable—and whether
that meaning is descriptive of the state of the world the legal actor is
trying to evaluate. 243

240 H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593,
607 (1958).
241 See generally Pierre Schlag, No Vehicles in the Park, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 381 (1999).
Typically the text in question is a statute or a constitutional provision, but the same general
approach applies to rules derived from the text of judicial opinions. See Schauer, supra note 98,
at 580–81 (“[T]he articulated characterization [within a judicial opinion] acts like a specifically
formulated rule. . . . Where there is an articulated characterization, therefore, the question
whether precedent can constrain may collapse into the question whether rules can constrain.”);
see also Scalia, supra note 208, at 1177 (“[B]y making the[ir] mode of analysis relatively
principled or relatively fact-specific, the courts can either establish general rules or leave ample
discretion for the future.”).
242 For a recent brief overview of the debate over originalism—in all its flavors—see Baude,
supra note 198, at 2351–63 (2015). For a review of the distinctions between originalists and a
leading competing school—living constitutionalism—see generally Ethan J. Leib, The Perpetual
Anxiety of Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353 (2007).
243 This is true even for those more recent and subtle theories that draw a distinction
between “semantic meaning” and “legal meaning,” such as the interpretation/construction
distinction championed by Larry Solum. See Lawrence B. Solum, The InterpretationConstruction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 103–08 (2010).
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We have come to identify such an exercise with the set-theoretic
concept of membership, and the uncertainty inherent in membership
evaluations with the imprecision of natural language. But let us assume
that a legal actor concludes that a particular directive is not predicative
of the case they must resolve—perhaps through a contestable exercise of
discretion in the evaluation of the case with respect to the directive’s
imprecise language. How then should the legal actor resolve the case to a
binary outcome? The notion of a universe of discourse implies that the
case must be a member of some other set, predicated by some other legal
directive.
Perhaps this other directive is simply a default rule at a high level of
generality—an example of the deontic-logical concept of
“defeasibility.” 244 Burdens of proof have this character: they direct an
outcome in favor of the non-burdened party whenever the burdened
party fails to establish membership in some set that would direct an
outcome in their favor. But not all alternative sets have this default (or
complementary) relationship to sets predicated by less general legal
rules. As we have seen, sometimes multiple legal rules are implicated in
a particular case, and they may conflict or coincide. Thus, evaluating a
case’s membership in a particular rule-based set is not the sum total of a
legal actor’s work. Rather, the actor must construct an internally
consistent universe of discourse comprised of whatever rule-based sets
she believes are implicated by her case—each of them mapping to
adjudicative outcomes—and then situate her case within that universe of
discourse. 245
This task is complicated by the dimension of generality, and the
need to mind relationships among multiple legal directives pitched at
different levels of generality. Nowhere is this complication more

See sources cited supra note 52 and accompanying text.
One very recent and quite helpful effort to model this type of exercise using
(nonmonotonic) default logic is Lawsky, supra note 22. Lawsky’s use of defeasible logic to
formally model complex statutory regimes involving exceptions and qualifications is a major
advance in modeling a universe of discourse defined by a single statute, or even a group of
related statutes such as the tax code. However, the problem of selecting which authorities, rules,
or principles are implicated in a particular case, and how they ought to be interpreted against
one another when they do not themselves say how they should be so interpreted, would remain
even if we accept that the logic of the individual implicated directives is defeasible rather than
monotonic.
244
245
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apparent than in the institution of precedent. The discussion of Kremen
v. Cohen 246 illustrated that a precedent can be read either extensionally
or intensionally. Extensionally, at the extreme, it may contribute
nothing more to a universe of discourse than “the facts treated by the
judge as material, and . . . his decision as based on them” 247—an element
of one of the complementary sets predicative of binary outcomes, rather
than a set in its own right. Intensionally, at the opposite extreme, the
“articulated characterization” offered by a court as a justification for its
decision—its reasoned opinion—may operate similarly to legislation,
providing a directive whose precision and generality may be arbitrarily
determined by the opining court itself, and which “constrains the use of
subsequent and inconsistent characterizations.” 248 Between these
extremes, lawyers and theorists may argue about the relative domains of
holding and dicta, and about the similarity and difference between the
facts of precedent and those of some instant case—in short, about the
appropriate level of generality at which to frame some directive derived
from the precedent. 249 A single precedent thus encapsulates the potential
for conflicts between multiple intensionally framed legal authorities
(such as statutes or constitutional provisions).
Any effort to constrain a legal actor’s discretion will have to engage
not only the actor’s evaluation of the relationship between the language
of particular rules and the state of the world the actor is called on to
evaluate according to such rules, but also her selection of which rules (at
which level of generality) to include in her universe of discourse, as well
as her selection of a strategy to resolve any conflicts among the rules she
selects. 250 The first task is the subject of rules of relevance, while the

See supra Section II.C.
Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161, 182
(1930).
248 Schauer, supra note 98, at 579–80.
249 As Frederick Schauer has noted, every judicial opinion that contains more than a
recitation of its facts and an outcome in some sense says more than is strictly necessary to the
outcome of a case. Schauer, supra note 162, at 648 (“If a reason that can be narrower is for that
reason dicta, then anything other than the announcement of an outcome is dicta.”). For a
review of theoretical treatments of the holding/dicta dichotomy, see generally Michael
Abramowicz & Maxwell Stearns, Defining Dicta, 57 STAN. L. REV. 953 (2005).
250 For an effort to formally reconcile this tension, see generally Horty, supra note 75.
246
247
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second is the subject of reconciliation rules. 251 We can refer to such
rules—which purport to direct a legal actor’s selection and application
of doctrinal rules—as meta-rules. The question is whether an earlier-intime legal actor—for example, a legislator enacting a statute or a judge
announcing a precedent—can create such meta-rules so as to effectively
constrain a later-in-time actor’s performance of these analytic tasks.
As I have said, the set-theoretic model, being purely descriptive,
does not require or prescribe any such meta-rules. Nor will I defend any
position on which such rules are desirable. But the model still allows us
to draw some conclusions about their properties, to the extent they are
included within a legal universe of discourse. To see why, we must
consider that whatever the substance of these rules of relevance or
reconciliation rules might be, they are still rules. That is, they purport to
provide directives to guide the behavior of legal actors. They thus have
all the set-theoretic characteristics of any other legal directive—
including the dimensions of precision and generality. They can be
modeled—and manipulated—using any of the set-theoretic relations
and operations reviewed in this Article. They therefore may present
similar—if not worse—problems of linguistic imprecision, and more
importantly will similarly be subject to formal discretion on the part of
legal actors who are, in turn, subject to them.
The famously contradictory judicial canons of statutory
construction 252 provide a familiar example. One of Llewellyn’s most
stark examples of “dueling canons” is his third: “Statutes are to be read
in the light of the common law,” but “[t]he common law gives way to a
statute which is inconsistent with it.” 253 Both of these canons purport to
do the work of reconciliation rules: to tell us how to resolve a conflict
between contradictory substantive rules derived from statute and
common law. Llewellyn’s point was that there is little guidance in the
law of interpretation as to which of these contradictory rules should
govern in any particular case—which we can recognize as a claim
regarding the non-existence of useful or widely accepted rules of
See supra Section IV.A.
See generally Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1949); Anita S.
Krishnakumar, Dueling Canons, 65 DUKE L.J. 909 (2015).
253 Llewellyn, supra note 252, at 401.
251
252
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relevance. Of course, even if this were not so, any such rule of relevance
would still be a rule that would require evaluation by the same legal
actor: The rule of relevance would merely push the problem of
discretion to a different degree of generality. Moreover, the application
of either canon identified by whatever rule of relevance we adopt would
also necessarily be ambiguous as among the formal strategies we
reviewed in Part III. For example, we do not know whether a commonlaw rule “giving way” requires an application of the Trump Card, or can
be honored via application of a No True Scotsman or a Tertium Quid; if
the last, we do not know what level of generality the new set should aim
for. In short, neither canon informs a court how to determine whether a
case before it ought instead to be evaluated against the canon not
followed, nor whether the implicated statute (or common-law rule, as
the case may be) should always, sometimes, or just in this instance
prevail over the conflicting rule. If the answer to the latter question is
“sometimes,” the canon provides no basis for determining when.
Thus, even if either of these canons provided definitive guidance
on whether a statutory rule or a contradictory common-law rule ought
to govern the outcome of a particular dispute as a matter of relevance,
neither that rule nor the selected canon would provide guidance on the
form such a disposition should take as a matter of reconciliation. In
other words, even meta-rules—those rules that might purport to cabin
formal discretion—are themselves subject to formal discretion.
Whatever one’s substantive views regarding, for example, the centrality
of text, the legitimate sources of legal meaning, the relevant historical or
reflective posture for interpretation, the allocation of power between
judges and legislators, the nature of stare decisis, or the distinction
between holding and dicta—such substantive commitments inevitably
must be put to work in the ordinary language of legal authorities, and do
their work in application to cases where such rules often contradict one
another. It is the task of resolving these conflicts that affords legal actors
a significant degree of formal—rather than merely substantive—
discretion.
At this point we begin to approach the limits of the set-theoretic
model. The model is, I think, a valuable tool for describing how legal
actors do what they do. It is unhelpful, and makes no claims to be
helpful, in describing what legal actors should do, or why they should do
so, or what motivates them. For example, the model gives us no
guidance as to which court—the District Court or the Second Circuit—
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had the better of the formal argument in Louboutin. 254 It does not tell us
whether the Kremen court should have “toe[d] the line” of the California
Supreme Court’s articulated characterization of the law of conversion or
instead built a new predicate around the extension of California cases
resolving claims of conversion of intangible property. 255 On either of
these questions, some more substantive theory—indeed, some
prescriptive theory—of the role of judges in a legal system is required.
Such prescriptive theories are legion; they range from Justice
Scalia’s “law of rules” to Cass Sunstein’s “minimalism.” 256 But these
theories do not have to do with the substance of legal rules. Nor have
they anything to do with precision of legal rules—a dimension of
linguistic indeterminacy that lacks this kind of normative freight.
Rather, they are normative positions regarding the judge’s role in
tending to the relations among legal sets. And the observation that such
normative positions can themselves constrain legal actors’ behavior—if
at all—only as meta-rules that share all the set-theoretic qualities of
doctrinal rules suggests that the problem of discretion is one of infinite
regress. As a matter of logical structure, law is sets “all the way down.”257
Later-in-time legal actors will be constrained by doctrinal rules
formulated in advance precisely to the extent that they share the wouldbe constrainer’s selection and application of the appropriate meta-rules
to evaluate against a particular state of the world, such that both actors
would construct the same universe of discourse when faced with the
same case. Discretionary and possibly strategic selection of membership
or inclusion moves in the construction of a universe of discourse gives a
legal actor significant power, not only to determine adjudicative
outcomes, but also to shape the development of doctrine in ways that
other legal actors at other points in time might disagree with.
Conversely, however, each such act of discretion will influence future
universes of discourse exactly to the extent that future legal actors allow
See supra Section IV.C.
See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
256 See generally Hathaway, supra note 238.
257 John Robert Ross, Constraints on Variables in Syntax (Sept. 1967) (unpublished thesis,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology) (on file with DSpace@MIT, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology) (“‘[W]e live on a crust of earth which is on the back of a giant turtle.’ . . . ‘But what
does this second turtle stand on?’ persisted James patiently. To this, the little old lady crowed
triumphantly, ‘It’s no use, Mr. James—it’s turtles all the way down.’”).
254
255
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them to. Constraint, in this view, is no more or less than convergence of
the logical moves underlying the behaviors of legal actors over time. In
this view, discretion is—as realists claim—an ineliminable property of
any system of category-based rules numbering more than one, while
legal determinacy is—as positivists claim—a matter of social fact—of
practice—rather than conceptual, logical, or moral necessity.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have developed a formal and structural model of
legal systems based on the tools of naïve set theory. I have demonstrated
how the tools of set theory may be applied to legal authorities and the
behavior of legal actors. I have shown how the structure of systems built
on set-theoretic logic gives rise to subtle formal distinctions in the settheoretic relations among which legal actors must choose in the work of
advocacy and adjudication. And I have demonstrated how recognition
of this deep formal structure of legal systems both clarifies the terms of
debate in various areas of legal theory and implies some emergent
structural properties of legal systems that substantive legal theory must
grapple with.

